[<prev] [next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20121203075135.GA1072@meddwl>
Date: Mon, 3 Dec 2012 08:51:35 +0100
From: Sergei Golubchik <serg@...monty.org>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>,
king cope <isowarez.isowarez.isowarez@...glemail.com>,
full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk, bugtraq@...urityfocus.com,
todd@...ketstormsecurity.org, submit@...sec.com,
Mitre CVE assign department <cve-assign@...re.org>,
Steven Christey <coley@...re.org>, security@...iadb.org, security@...ql.com,
Ritwik Ghoshal <ritwik.ghoshal@...cle.com>, moderators@...db.org
Subject: Re: [oss-security] Re: [Full-disclosure] MySQL (Linux) Stack based
buffer overrun PoC Zeroday
Hi, king cope!
On Dec 02, king cope wrote:
> Hi,
> My opinion is that the FILE to admin privilege elevation should be
> patched. What is the reason to have FILE and ADMIN privileges
> seperated when with this exploit FILE privileges equate to ALL ADMIN
> privileges.
> I understand that it's insecure to have FILE privileges attached to a
> user. But if this a configuration issue and not a vulnerability then
> as stated above there must be something wrong with the privilege
> management in this SQL server.
You've missed that part of my reply:
> > Additionally, MySQL (and MariaDB) provides a --secure-file-priv
> > option that allows to restrict all FILE operations to a specific
> > directory.
Normally, if a DBA wants to grant FILE privilege to users, the server
will have something like secure-file-priv=/tmp/mysql (for example)
specified in the configuration file. This way any operation allowed by
the FILE privilege (like SELECT ... OUTFILE) will only be able to access
files under the /tmp/mysql/ path.
Regards,
Sergei
Powered by blists - more mailing lists