bugtraq - Re: [Full-disclosure] Apache suEXEC privilege elevation / information disclosure

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Message-ID: <5207B021.3070508@thelounge.net>
Date: Sun, 11 Aug 2013 17:39:13 +0200
From: Reindl Harald <h.reindl@...lounge.net>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Apache suEXEC privilege elevation / information
 disclosure



Am 11.08.2013 14:50, schrieb Ansgar Wiechers:
> On 2013-08-11 Reindl Harald wrote:
>> Am 10.08.2013 16:52, schrieb Tobias Kreidl:
>>> It is for this specific reason that utilities like suPHP can be used
>>> as a powerful tool to at least keep the account user from shooting
>>> anyone but him/herself in the foot because of any configuration or
>>> broken security issues. Allowing suexec to anyone but a seasoned,
>>> responsible admin is IMO a recipe for disaster.
>>
>> and what makes you believe that a developer can not be a "seasoned,
>> responsible admin"?
> 
> Most developers I have met would focus on getting new features to work
> rather than secure/reliable operation of the deployed software

maybe you met the wrong ones............

on the other hand most admins i met did not use "disallow_functions"
a responsilble developer which is at the same time admin has the
knowledge not using dangerous functions and disables them

one config line and the whole topic would be obsolete by not
allowing symlinks from web-applications

disable_functions  = "popen, pclose, exec, passthru, shell_exec, system, proc_open, proc_close, proc_nice,
proc_terminate, proc_get_status, pcntl_exec, apache_child_terminate, posix_kill, posix_mkfifo, posix_setpgid,
posix_setsid, posix_setuid, mail, symlink, link, dl, get_current_user, getmypid, getmyuid, getrusage, pfsockopen,
socket_accept, socket_bind, openlog, syslog"

>> bullshit, many of the "seasoned, responsible admins" which are only
>> admins are unable to really understand the implications of whatever
>> config they rollout
> 
> Apparently you still haven't learned your lesson from being banned from
> the postfix-users mailing list

oh i forgot, in the enlish speaking world in have to write
"clould i ask you please could consider to think about...."


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