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Message-ID: <5405A999.3000805@checkssh.com>
Date: Tue, 02 Sep 2014 19:27:21 +0800
From: John Leo <johnleo@...ckssh.com>
To: Jeroen van der Ham <jeroen@...d.nl>,
Stephanie Daugherty <sdaugherty@...il.com>
CC: fulldisclosure@...lists.org, bugtraq@...urityfocus.com,
bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Re: [FD] SSH host key fingerprint - through HTTPS
Nice to hear from you!
I can only wish your suggestion is widely implemented. And don't forget those machines without domain.
Best Wishes,
On 2014-9-2 04:21, Jeroen van der Ham wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On 1 Sep 2014, at 10:43, Stephanie Daugherty <sdaugherty@...il.com> wrote:
>
>> Sure it shows me the fingerprint, but it doesn't tell me for sure if that's
>> the RIGHT fingerprint or the fingerprint of an imposter,
>>
>> It's entirely possible that both myself and that site are BOTH falling
>> victim to a MITM attack.(routing attacks, DNS attacks, etc)
>>
>> Proper host key verification (which nobody does) ideally means one or more
>> of:
>> * Verification that the SSH host key is connected via certificate chain to
>> a trusted certificate,
>> * Comparison to a fingerprint being posted on the organization's OWN https
>> site
>> * Comparison to a fingerprint provided with a GPG or S/MIME signature from
>> the administrator of the machine.
>> * Voice verification of the host public key or its fingerprint with the
>> administrator of the machine.
>> * Obtaining a printed copy of the host public key or its fingerprint
>> directly from the administrator.
>>
>
>
> There is a way now, using the “magic” of DNSSEC and SSHFP records: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4255
>
> You use the DNSSEC hierarchy to create a trust chain. You can then securely publish a signed fingerprint of your SSH host key for that specific machine.
>
> Jeroen.
>
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