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Message-ID: <ce4571dbb6ba4d6aaf54082fc94a2e25@RAMNL-EX.Ram.nl>
Date: Fri, 7 Aug 2015 06:52:57 +0000
From: Frank Waarsenburg <fwaarsenburg@...-it.nl>
To: 'Steve Friedl' <steve@...xwiz.net>,
'Stefan Kanthak' <stefan.kanthak@...go.de>, 'Mario Vilas' <mvilas@...il.com>
CC: 'bugtraq' <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>,
'fulldisclosure' <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>
Subject: RE: [FD] Mozilla extensions: a security nightmare
Time to unsubscribe from Bugtraq. I follow that list to be informed of vulnerabilities, not to get spammed by fighting ego's. Get a life.
___________________________________
Frank Waarsenburg
Chief Information Security Officer
RAMÂ Infotechnology
-----Original Message-----
From: Steve Friedl [mailto:steve@...xwiz.net]
Sent: vrijdag 7 augustus 2015 8:17
To: 'Stefan Kanthak'; 'Mario Vilas'
Cc: 'bugtraq'; 'fulldisclosure'
Subject: RE: [FD] Mozilla extensions: a security nightmare
> Posting on top because that's where the cursor happens to be is like
sh*tt*ng in your pants because that's where your *ssh*l* happens to be!
Here, let me fix this for you:
> "I don't expect to be taking seriously by any technical community"
-----Original Message-----
From: Stefan Kanthak [mailto:stefan.kanthak@...go.de]
Sent: Thursday, August 06, 2015 12:33 PM
To: Mario Vilas
Cc: bugtraq; fulldisclosure
Subject: Re: [FD] Mozilla extensions: a security nightmare
"Mario Vilas" <mvilas@...il.com> wrote:
> W^X applies to memory protection, completely irrelevant here.
I recommend to revisit elementary school and start to learn reading!
http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2015/Aug/8
| JFTR: current software separates code from data in virtual memory and
| uses "write xor execute" or "data execution prevention" to
| prevent both tampering of code and execution of data.
| The same separation and protection can and of course needs to be
| applied to code and data stored in the file system too!
> Plus you're saying in every situation when a user can overwrite its
> own binaries in its own home folder it's a bug
Again: learn to read!
<http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2015/Aug/14>
| No. Writing executable code is NOT the problem here.
| The problem is running this code AFTER it has been tampered.
| (Not only) Mozilla but does NOT detect tampered code.
> - that would make every single Linux distro vulnerable whenever you
> install some software in your own home directory that only you can use.
# mount /home -onoexec
> If you're talking about file and directory permissions it makes sense
> to talk about privilege escalation.
No.
> But I don't think you really understand those security principles
> you're citing. For example, can you give me an example of an attack
scenario?
The attack vector is OBVIOUS, exploitation is TRIVIAL.
> Also, take a chill pill. Your aggressive tone isn't really helping you
> at all.
Posting on top because that's where the cursor happens to be is like sh*tt*ng in your pants because that's where your *ssh*l* happens to be!
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