bugtraq - Proftpd ZERODAY - Malloc issues Advanced Information Security Corporation

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Message-ID: <CA+CewVBT7ZScYskAUJw2OfCvLdoqh62pXs0phEBE7O3ngBBxVQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 22 Nov 2015 22:59:24 +0000
From: "Nicholas Lemonias." <lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Proftpd ZERODAY - Malloc issues Advanced Information Security Corporation

Advanced Information Security Corporation

===============================================
                             Date: 22/11/2015
                     Credit: Nicholas Lemonias

====================================================
  .:: PROFTPD  v1.3.5a  HEAP OVERFLOWS ::.

=====================================================

ADVANCED INFORMATION SECURITY CORPORATION

                                                   Keeping Things Simple!


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====================================================
Description: During a brief manual source code audit of ProFTPD latest
various security issues were discovered.
=====================================================


===========================
VULNERABILITIES
===========================

../proftpd-master/src/pool.c:89-116

(Heap Overflow due to zero length malloc allocation)

CERT MEM04-C; CWE-131

Code Snippet:
............................


    ret = malloc(size);
  }
  if (ret == NULL) {
    pr_log_pri(PR_LOG_ALERT, "Out of memory!");
#ifdef PR_USE_DEVEL
    if (debug_flags & PR_POOL_DEBUG_FL_OOM_DUMP_POOLS) {
      pr_pool_debug_memory(oom_printf);
    }
#endif
    exit(1);
  }
  return ret;
}

========================
TECHNICAL EXPLANATION
========================
The return value of malloc can be set to null for zero size allocs,
and this would return a NULL pointer on certain implementations of
MIPS32 and ARM architectures, or cause a SIGSEGV.  Despite the exit()
function call, the memory allocation would be attempted.

Embedded platforms such as OpenWRT could be targeted and this defect
can be taken advantage of, depending on where the swap is, this can be
exploited.

This would have critical impact on architectures such as ARM and
MIPS32  used in embedded platforms, to cite as an example, and thus
the impact is implementation specific.


=================
CODE SNIPPET 2
=================

Line: 371-379
CERT MEM04-C; CWE-131

static cmd_rec *fxp_cmd_alloc(pool *p, const char *name, char *arg) {
  cmd_rec *cmd;

  cmd = pr_cmd_alloc(p, 2, pstrdup(p, name), arg ? arg : "");
  cmd->arg = arg;

  return cmd;
}

fxp_cmd_alloc() can be a cause for unspecified behavior on certain
architectures..


Furthermore there is a memory pool Management defect can result to
memory exhaustion / Denial of Service.
..................................................
../src/pool.c:128-160, 771, 811
.................................................

There is a defect in the way the memory pool is organized. The issue
itself is that the pool relies on malloc returning truly aligned
memory; and explicitly freeing/allocating memory. The impact is that
you can overwrite random memory.

Behavior and impact of this reliance on aligned memory is
implementation specific.



============================================
Reading USER_AUTH_INFO_RESP messages from client
../mod_sftp/kbdint.c#L297 Denial of Service
=============================================

According to RFC 4256 Section 3.2 The server may send as many requests
as are necessary to authenticate the client; the client MUST be
prepared to handle multiple exchanges.
According to RFC 4256 Section 3.2 The server may send as many requests
as are necessary to authenticate the client; the client MUST be
prepared to handle multiple exchanges.

kbdint.c: 209-210
 ===================

RATIONALE
.....................

IF multiple clients send multiple requests and where each request
(resp_count in code) is thus not greater than SFTP_KBDINT_MAX_RESPONSE
LIMIT (500) per user, this would cause significant problems to the
aforementioned memory allocation pool defect.

I could find no plausible MAX LIMIT on the size of the pool, nor any
controls to restrict that apart from a buffer size which is equal to
3072 in kbdint.c for the created pool, which can be crafted on a per
connection basis.

  kbdint.c: 209-210

  buflen = bufsz = 3072;
  buf = ptr = palloc(pkt->pool, bufsz);


==============================
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
==============================

 PacketStorm Security
TEAM TESO, w00w00, Netric, b0iler (eyeonsecurity), wootehfoot,
badpack3t (SP), Vandal (Vic), s0kket, mantis,  Big_Al , ELFQrin, bob
(dtors),  epic  for their ~ legendary mark.


Advanced Information Security Corporation, 2015