bugtraq - Executable installers are vulnerable^WEVIL (case 21): Panda Security's installers allow arbitrary (remote) code execution AND escalation of privilege with PANDAIS16.exe

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Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 17:49:01 +0100
From: "Stefan Kanthak" <stefan.kanthak@...go.de>
To: <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>
Cc: <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>
Subject: Executable installers are vulnerable^WEVIL (case 21): Panda Security's installers allow arbitrary (remote) code execution AND escalation of privilege with PANDAIS16.exe

Hi @ll,

the executable installers PANDAIS16.exe, PANDAAP16.exe,
PANDAGL16.exe and PANDAGP16.exe available from
<www.pandasecurity.com> load and execute (at least) UXTheme.dll,
RichEd20.dll and RichEd32.dll from their "application directory".

For software downloaded with a web browser the application
directory is typically the user's "Downloads" directory: see
<https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2008/09/carpet-bombing-and-directory-poisoning.html>,
<http://blog.acrossecurity.com/2012/02/downloads-folder-binary-planting.html>
and <http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2012/Aug/134>

If an attacker places the above named DLLs in the users "Downloads"
directory (for example per drive-by download or social engineering)
this vulnerability becomes a remote code execution.

Due to the application manifest embedded in the executables which
specifies "requireAdministrator" the executable installer is run
with administrative privileges ("protected" administrators are
prompted for consent, unprivileged standard users are prompted for
an administrator password); execution of the DLLs therefore results
in an escalation of privilege!

Proof of concept/demonstration:
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

1. visit <http://home.arcor.de/skanthak/sentinel.html>, download
   <http://home.arcor.de/skanthak/download/SENTINEL.DLL>, save it
   as UXTheme.dll in your "Downloads" directory, then copy it as
   RichEd20.dll and RichEd32.dll;

2. download PANDA{IS,AP,GL,GP}16.exe and save it in your "Downloads"
   directory;

3. run PANDA{IS,AP,GL,GP}16.exe per double-click from your "Downloads"
   directory;

4. notice the message boxes displayed from the DLLs placed in step 1.

PWNED!

See <http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Nov/101> and
<http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/86> as well as
<http://home.arcor.de/skanthak/!execute.html> and
<http://home.arcor.de/skanthak/sentinel.html> for details about
this well-known and well-documented BEGINNER'S error!

regards
Stefan Kanthak

PS: I really LOVE (security) software with such trivial beginner's
    errors. It's a tell-tale sign to stay away from this crapware!

Timeline:
~~~~~~~~~

2015-12-29    sent report to vendor

              NP ANSWER, not even an acknowledgement of receipt

2016-01-10    resent report to vendor

              NO ANSWER, not even an acknowledgement of receipt

2016-01-19    report published