Message-Id: <201607291042.u6TAgO6T031896@sf01web1.securityfocus.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Jul 2016 10:42:24 GMT
From: matthias.deeg@...s.de
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: [SYSS-2016-046]  Perixx PERIDUO-710W - Missing Protection against
 Replay Attacks

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Advisory ID: SYSS-2016-046
Product: PERIDUO-710W
Manufacturer: Perixx Computer GmbH
Affected Version(s): Part No. KG-1027
Tested Version(s): Part No. KG-1027
Vulnerability Type: Cryptographic Issues (CWE-310)
                    Missing Protection against Replay Attacks
Risk Level: Medium
Solution Status: Open
Manufacturer Notification: 2016-05-27
Solution Date: -
Public Disclosure: 2016-07-29
CVE Reference: Not yet assigned
Authors of Advisory: Matthias Deeg and Gerhard Klostermeier (SySS GmbH)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Overview:

PERIDUO-710W is a wireless desktop set consisting of a mouse and a
keyboard.

The manufacturer describes the product as follows (see [1]):

"PERIDUO can create flexible, convenient and wireless working
environment with its design. PERIDUO offers a reliable 2.4GHz high
frequency penetration, low interference, and omni-directional signal
transmissions with 10Meters meters [sic] receiving distance." 

Due to an insecure implementation of the encrypted data communication,
the wireless keyboard PERIDUO-710W is prone to replay attacks.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Vulnerability Details:

The SySS GmbH found out that the wireless keyboard PERIDUO-710W is prone
to replay attacks.

An attacker can sniff the AES-encrypted data packets of the 2.4 GHz
radio communication sent by the keyboard to the transceiver (USB dongle)
and replay the recorded communication data at will causing the same
effect as the original data communication.

A replay attack against the keyboard can, for example, be used to gain
unauthorized access to a computer system that is operated with a
vulnerable PERIDUO-710W keyboard. In this attack scenario, an attacker
records the radio communication during a password-based user
authentication of his or her victim, for instance during a login to the
operating system or during unlocking a screen lock. At an opportune
moment when the victim's computer system is unattended, the attacker
approaches the victim's computer and replays the previously recorded
AES-encrypted data communication for the password-based user
authentication and thereby gets unauthorized access to the victim's
system.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Proof of Concept (PoC):

The SySS GmbH could successfully perform a replay attack as described
in the previous section using the USB radio dongle Crazyradio PA (see
[3]) and an in-house developed proof-of-concept software tool.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Solution:

The SySS GmbH is not aware of a solution for this reported security
vulnerability.

For further information please contact the manufacturer.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Disclosure Timeline:

2016-05-27: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer
2016-06-06: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer again
2016-07-29: Public release of the security advisory

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

References:

[1] User manual for Perixx PERIDUO-710W
    http://perixx.com/en/service/Perixx_Manual/DUO/PERIDUO-710_manual.pdf
[2] Product website for Perixx PERIDUO-710W
    http://perixx.com/en/products/perixx-pro-11.html
[3] Product website for Crazyradio PA
    https://www.bitcraze.io/crazyradio-pa/
[4] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2016-046
    https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2016-046.txt
[5] SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy
    https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy/

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Credits:

This security vulnerability was found by Matthias Deeg and Gerhard
Klostermeier of the SySS GmbH.

E-Mail: matthias.deeg (at) syss.de
Public Key: https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Materialien/PGPKeys/Matthias_Deeg.asc
Key fingerprint = D1F0 A035 F06C E675 CDB9 0514 D9A4 BF6A 34AD 4DAB

E-Mail: gerhard.klostermeier (at) syss.de
Public Key: https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/PGPKeys/Gerhard_Klostermeier.asc
Key fingerprint = 8A9E 75CC D510 4FF6 8DB5 CC30 3802 3AAB 573E B2E7

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Disclaimer:

The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is" 
and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may 
be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The
latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS Web 
site.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Copyright:

Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 3.0
URL: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en

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