lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
Hash Suite for Android: free password hash cracker in your pocket
[<prev] [next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Wed, 4 Jul 2018 11:14:52 +0200
From: "Stefan Kanthak" <>
To: <>
Cc: <>
Subject: [CVE-2018-3667, CVE-2018-3668] Escalation of priviilege via executable installer of Intel Processor Diagnostic Tool

Hi @ll,

the executable installers of Intel's Processor Diagnostic Tool
(IPDT) before v4.1.0.27 have three vulnerabilities^Wbeginner's
errors which all allow arbitrary code execution with escalation
of privilege, plus a fourth which allows denial of service.

Intel published advisory SA-00140
on 2018-06-27 and updated installers on 2018-05-18.

The vulnerabilities can be exploited in standard installations
of Windows where the user^WUAC-"protected administrator" account
created during Windows setup is used, without elevation.
This precondition holds for the majority of Windows installations:
according to Microsoft's own security intelligence reports
<>, about 1/2 to 3/4 of the
about 600 million Windows installations which send telemetry data
have only ONE active user account.

#1 Denial of service through insecure file permissions

   The downloadable executable installer (really: executable
   self-extractor built with WinZIP) IPDT_Installer_4.1.0.24.exe
   creates a subdirectory with random name in %TEMP%, copies
   itself into this subdirectory and then executes its copy.

   The subdirectory inherits the NTFS ACLs from its parent
   %TEMP%, and so does the copy of the executable self-extractor.

   For this well-known and well-documented vulnerability see
   <> and
   <> plus

   Proof of concept/demonstration:

   1. download IPDT_Installer_4.1.0.24.exe (quite some clueless
      copycats still offer it, violating Intel's copyright;
      and save it in your "Downloads" directory";

   2. add the NTFS access control list entry (D;OIIO;WP;;;WD)
      meaning "deny execution of files in this directory for
      everyone, inheritable to files in all subdirectories"
      to the (user's) %TEMP% directory.

   3. execute IPDT_Installer_4.1.024.exe: notice the complete
      failure of the executable installer^Wself-extractor,
      WITHOUT error message!

#2 Escalation of privilege through insecure file permissions

   Although the (copy of the) executable self-extractor runs with
   administrative privileges (its embedded "application manifest"
   specifies 'requireAdministrator'), it extracts its payload, the
   REAL installers setup.exe and setup64.exe, plus the batch script
   setup.bat, UNPROTECTED into the user's %TEMP% directory, CD's
   into %TEMP% and finally executes the extracted batch script

   --- setup.bat ---
   echo off

   ver | findstr 6.1.7600
   if %errorlevel%==0 goto WinUnsup

   ver | findstr 6.0.6001
   if %errorlevel%==0 goto WinUnsup

   if "%programfiles(x86)%XXX"=="XXX" goto 32BIT

   goto END

   goto END

   echo Intel Processor Diagnostic Tool cannot be installed on this Operating System
   echo Please go to Online support page to view list of supported Oerating Systems


   exit 0
   --- EOF ---

   The extracted files inherit the NTFS ACLs from their parent
   %TEMP%, allowing "full access" for the unprivileged (owning)
   user, who can replace/overwrite the files between their creation
   and execution.

   Since the files are executed with administrative privileges,
   this vulnerability results in arbitrary code execution with
   escalation of privilege.

   Proof of concept/demonstration:

   1. create the following batch script in an arbitrary directory:

      --- IPDT.CMD ---
      @If Not Exist "%TEMP%\setup.exe" Goto :LOOP1

      Echo >"%TEMP%\setup.bat" WhoAMI.exe /all
      Echo >>"%TEMP%\setup.bat" Pause

      @If Not Exist "%TEMP%\setup64.exe" Goto :LOOP2

      Copy /Y %COMSPEC% "%TEMP%\setup.exe"

      @Copy %COMSPEC% "%TEMP%\setup64.exe"
      @If ERRORLEVEL 1 Goto :LOOP3
      --- EOF ---

   NOTE: the batch script needs to win a race (which it almost
         always will, due to the size of the files extracted).

   2. execute the batch script per double-click;

   3. execute IPDT_Installer_4.1.024.exe per double-click: notice
      the command processor started instead one of the executable
      installers, running with administrative privileges.

#3 Escalation of privilege through unsafe search path

   In Windows Vista and newer versions, the current working
   directory can be removed from the executable search path:

   The batch script setup.bat calls setup.exe and setup64.exe
   without a path, so the command processor doesn't find the
   extracted setup.exe and setup64.exe in its CWD and searches
   them via %PATH%.

   %PATH% is under full control of the unprivileged user, who
   can create rogue setup.exe and setup64.exe in an arbitrary
   directory he adds to the %PATH%, resulting again in arbitrary
   code execution with escalation of privilege.

   For this well-known and well-documented vulnerability see
   <> and
   <> plus

   Proof of concept/demonstration:

   1. start an unprivileged command prompt in an arbitrary
      directory where the unprivileged user can create files,
      for example the user's "Downloads" directory;

   2. add this (current working) directory to the user's PATH:

      PATH %CD%;%PATH%
      REG.exe Add HKCU\Environment /V PATH /T REG_SZ /D "%CD%" /F

   3. copy the command processor %COMSPEC% (or any rogue executable
      of your choice) as setup.exe and setup64.exe into the current
      (working) directory:

      COPY %COMSPEC% "%CD%\setup.exe"
      COPY %COMSPEC% "%CD%\setup64.exe"

   4. set the environment variable NoDefaultCurrentDirectoryInExePath
      to an arbitrary value:

      SET NoDefaultCurrentDirectoryInExePath=*
      REG.exe Add HKCU\Environment /V NoDefaultCurrentDirectoryInExePath /T REG_SZ /D "*" /F

   5. execute IPDT_Installer_4.1.024.exe per double-click: notice
      the command processor started instead of the extracted
      executable installers, running with administrative privileges.

#4 Escalation of privilege through DLL search order hijacking

   The extracted executable installers setup.exe and setup64.exe,
   built with the crapware known as InstallShield, load multiple
   Windows system DLLs from their "application directory" %TEMP%
   instead from Windows' "system directory" %SystemRoot%\System32\

   To quote Raymond Chen

   | a rogue DLL in the TEMP directory is a trap waiting to be sprung.

   An unprivileged attacker running in the same user account can
   copy rogue DLLs into %TEMP%; these are loaded and their DllMain()
   routine executed with administrative privileges, once more
   resulting in arbitrary code execution with escalation of privilege.

   For this well-known and well-documented vulnerability see
   <> and
   <> plus

   Proof of concept/demonstration:

   1. follow the instructions from
      and build a minefield of forwarder DLLs in your %TEMP%

   NOTE: if you can't or don't want to build the minefield, download
         and save it as UXTheme.dll, DWMAPI.dll, NTMARTA.dll and
         MSI.dll in your %TEMP% directory.

   2. execute IPDT_Installer_4.1.0.24.exe: notice the message boxes
      displayed from the DLLs built in step 1!

   NOTE: on a fully patched Windows 7 SP1, setup64.exe loads at
         least the following 32-bit DLLs from %TEMP%:
         UXTheme.dll, Version.dll, NTMARTA.dll and MSI.dll

         Due to its filename, setup.exe additionally loads WinMM.dll,
         SAMCli.dll, MSACM32.dll, SFC.dll, SFC_OS.dll, DWMAPI.dll and


1. DUMP all those forever vulnerable executable installers and
   self-extractors; provide an .MSI package or an .INF script plus
   a .CAB archive instead!

2. NEVER use an unqualified filename to execute/load an application
   or a DLL, ALWAYS specify their fully qualified pathname!


1. DON'T execute executable self-extractors.

2. NEVER execute executable self-extractors with administrative

3. extract the payload of the self-extractor with a SAFE and SECURE
   unzip.exe into a properly protected directory.

4. exercise STRICT privilege separation: use separate unprivileged
   user accounts and privileged administrator account, DISABLE the
   "security theatre" UAC in the unprivileged user accounts.

stay tuned
Stefan Kanthak

PS: the "portable executable" IPDT_Installer_4.1.024.exe has an
    export directory, but does NOT export any symbols: both the
    numbers of names and functions are 0, and the RVAs of the
    functions, names and ordinals arrays are 0 too.


2018-03-28    sent vulnerability report to <>

              no reply, not even an acknowledgement of receipt

2018-04-05    resent vulnerability report to <>,
              CC: to CERT/CC

              no reply, not even an acknowledgement of receipt

2018-05-03    resent vulnerability report via HackerOne

2018-05-04    Intel acknowledges receipt

2018-05-17    Intel confirms the reported vulnerabilities

2018-05-21    Intel publishes fixed installers, with a dangling
              reference to SA-00140 in the release notes, plus
              inaccuracies regarding the dependencies of IPDT

              NO notification sent to me that fixes have been

2018-06-05    sent report about the errors in the release notes
              after stumbling over the fixes

2018-06-12    Intel acknowledges the report regarding the notes

2018-06-27    Intel publishes their advisory SA-00140

              AGAIN no notification sent that the advisory has
              been published!
              Intel's understanding of coordinated disclosure
              looks rather weird to me.

Powered by blists - more mailing lists