lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Thu, 6 Sep 2018 11:32:42 +0200
From: Sebastian Neuner <sneuner@...gle.com>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Vulnerabilities in KONEs Group Controller (KGC)

Vulnerabilities in KONEs Group Controller (KGC)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------


Introduction
============
Vulnerabilities were identified in the KONE Group Controller (KGC).
These were discovered during a black box assessment and therefore the
vulnerability list should not be considered exhaustive.

The version under test was indicated as: 4.6.4


Comment added by KONE
=====================
KONE Group Controller (KGC) is an elevator group controller computer,
installed in the elevator machine room of a building. Its purpose is
to optimize the operation of a group of elevators, and it allows
features such as destination calls and locking and unlocking floors.
Group controller is not an essential component of an elevator control
system and vulnerabilities in KGC do not affect the safety of the
elevators connected to the group.
More information at https://www.kone.com/en/vulnerability.aspx


Affected Software And Versions
==============================
- KONE KGC version 4.6.4 and below


CVE
===
The following CVEs were assigned to the issues described in this report:
CVE-2018-15483
CVE-2018-15484
CVE-2018-15485
CVE-2018-15486


Vulnerability Overview
======================
 01. CVE-2018-15484: Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution
 02. CVE-2018-15486: Unauthenticated Local File Inclusion /
Unauthenticated Local File modification
 03. CVE-2018-15485: FTP without authentication and authorization
 04. CVE-2018-15483: Denial of Service


Vulnerability Details
=====================


---------------------------------------------
CVE-2018-15484: Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution
---------------------------------------------

By modifying the file autoexec.bat via the web interface using an
unauthenticated local file modification method (see CVE-2018-15486),
an attacker can inject arbitrary operating systems commands, which get
executed at boot time. To trigger a reboot, an HTTP GET request to
/reboot has to be made. This enables an attacker to compromise the
integrity of all software running on the device.

This includes specific autoexec commands but also the full range of
command.com (operating system) commands regarding to FreeDOS.

Injecting an interactive command, such as the help command,
effectively prevents the KGC from booting up again and therefore
causes a Denial of Service Attack (CVE-2018-15483).


--------------------------------------------------
CVE-2018-15486: Unauthenticated Local File Inclusion / Unauthenticated
Local File modification
--------------------------------------------------

By modifying the name parameter of the file endpoint, any file the
webserver has access to can be viewed.

GET /file?name=secret.txt HTTP/1.1
Host: <redacted>

However, more importantly, by modifying the name parameter of the
editfile endpoint, any file can be modified:

GET /editfile?name=secret.txt HTTP/1.1
Host: <redacted>

After calling the endpoint above, the file to edit is presented in a
textbox for modification.
This way, attackers can choose from a wide range of attack scenarios,
e.g., persisting backdoors in files such as KERNEL.SYS, enable access
to floors, they wouldn't have access to in normal cases (KGC config
files) or carry out DNS redirection- and Man-in-the-Middle attacks.
The latter could be achieved by modifying the DNS parameter or the
default gateway, respectively:

[ETHERNET]
card=7
: DHCP on or off [0-1]
: Attacker would switch to 0
dhcp=0
: Static IP address [IP]
: Set a static IP
ip=<static IP>
: Subnet mask [IP]
mask=<appropriate mask>
: Default gateway [IP]
: Change gateway
default_gateway=<attacker controlled gateway>
: DNS [IP]
dns=<attacker controlled dns server>
: Host name [string]
host_name=KGC_1

This way, an attacker could read and modify all the data transmitted
over the wires.


-----------------------------------------------
CVE-2018-15485: FTP without authentication and authorization
-----------------------------------------------

FTP on the KGC is enabled on port 21 and is not secured by
authentication or authorization mechanisms.

A user that connects to that port is logged in as SuperUser, with
needing a username or password (also blank usernames and passwords are
accepted).

$ ftp -p <redacted-IP>
Connected to <redacted-IP>.
220 KGC FTP Server ready
Name (<redacted-IP>:username): <blank>
331 User name okay, need password.
Password: <blank>
230 SuperUser logged in, proceed.
Remote system type is WIN32.

This way all available data can be downloaded and new data can be
uploaded to the KGC.


---------------------------------------------
CVE-2018-15483: Denial of Service
---------------------------------------------

There are several possible ways to cause a denial of service on the KGC.
One of them is the possibility to reboot the system via the web
interface. An attacker could reboot the system every time it boots
back up to interrupt the service and cause a denial of service attack:

GET /reboot HTTP/1.1
Host: <redacted>


Author
======
The vulnerabilities were discovered by Sebastian Neuner
(@sebastian9er) from the Google Security Team.


Timeline
========
2018/05/10 - Security report sent to KONE security.
2018/05/11 - KONE acknowledges the report and starts working on the issues.
2018/05/25 - KONE requested grace period due to internal patch cycle.
2018/05/25 - Google granted grace period until patch available and
being deployed.
2018/08/06 - Public disclosure on the bugtraq Mailing List.

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ