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Message-ID: <2466482E-B009-11D6-80C5-00039359BF60@sackheads.org>
From: cerebus at sackheads.org (Timothy J.Miller)
Subject: Anyone buy this?
On Wednesday, August 14, 2002, at 06:54 PM, Fenris The Wolf wrote:
> http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp?url=/technet/security/
> news/IARWSV.asp
I will say I'm not surprised. What else should be expected?
> The identity of the attacker could easily be determined. To exploit the
> vulnerability, the attacker would require a valid SSL digital
> certificate,
> issued by a trusted Certificate Authority. However, most commercial
> Certificate Authorities require substantial proof of identity before
> issuing
> such a certificate,
Yeah, just like Verisign confirmed the spoofer who got new signing certs
issued to him in Microsoft's name.
> The user would always have the ability to determine the truth.
While this is certainly technically true, it's not *practically* true.
The average user knows fsck-all about X.509 and certificate chaining,
much less how to use Microsoft's certificate display dialog.
> Clearly, it would have been best if a balanced assessment of the
> issue and its risk had been available from the start.
Never mind that FAILING TO VERIFY BASIC CONSTRAINTS is SUCH A FREAKING
STUPID ERROR that it SHOULD NEVER HAVE EVER FSCKING HAPPENED IN THE
FIRST GODDAMN PLACE... *ahem* Excuse me, sometimes I just get riled.
Obviously "balanced assessment" has a meaning I wasn't aware of. From
the context it apparently means "brought to light in a way that didn't
make us look like morons."
Trusted Computing at work.
-- Cerebus
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