Message-ID: <15807.36694.401146.577051@home.nest.cx>
From: greg-fulldisclosure at nest.cx (Gregory Steuck)
Subject: XXE (Xml eXternal Entity) attack

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Gregory Steuck security advisory #1, 2002

Overview:
 XXE (Xml eXternal Entity) attack is an attack on an application that parses
 XML input from untrusted sources using incorrectly configured XML parser.
 The application may be coerced to open arbitrary files and/or TCP connections.

Legal Notice:
 This Advisory is Copyright (c) 2002 Gregory Steuck.
 You may distribute it unmodified.
 You may not modify it and distribute it or distribute parts
 of it without the author's written permission.

Disclaimer:
 The information in this advisory is believed to be true though
 it may be false.
 The opinions expressed in this advisory and program are my own and
 not of any company. The usual standard disclaimer applies,
 especially the fact that Gregory Steuck is not liable for any damages
 caused by direct or  indirect use of the information or functionality
 provided by this advisory or program. Gregory Steuck bears no
 responsibility for content or misuse of this advisory or program or
 any derivatives thereof.
 Anything in this document may change without notice.

Details:
 External entity references allow embedding data outside the main file into
 an XML document. In the DTD, one declares the external reference with the
 following syntax:
  <!ENTITY name SYSTEM "URI">

 XML processor behavior as specified is
 [http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-xml#include-if-valid]:

  "When an XML processor recognizes a reference to a parsed entity, in
  order to validate the document, the processor must include its
  replacement text. If the entity is external, and the processor is not
  attempting to validate the XML document, the processor may, but need
  not, include the entity's replacement text..."

 Now assume that the XML processor parses data originating from a source under
 attacker control. Most of the time the processor will not be validating,
 but it MAY include the replacement text thus initiating an unexpected
 file open operation, or HTTP transfer, or whatever system ids the XML
 processor knows how to access.

Suspect systems:
 The buzz on the street is "web services". They accept XML encoded
 data over the network, sometimes from untrusted clients. So, the
 prime targets are SOAP and XMLRPC implementations. Yet, there are
 many more XML based protocols and vulnerability does not necessary
 lie with the servers. Pick any "XML based network protocol" and
 try to apply the attack methodology.

Suggested fix:
 Most XML parsers allow their user to explicitly specify external
 entity handler. In case of untrusted XML input it is best to prohibit
 all external general entities.

Successful exploitation may yield:
 * DoS on the parsing system by making it open, e.g.
   file:///dev/random | file:///dev/urandom | file://c:/con/con
 * TCP scans using HTTP external entities (including behind firewalls
   since application servers often have world view different
   from that of the attacker)
 * Unauthorized access to data stored as XML files on the parsing
   system file system (of course the attacker still needs a way to
   get these data back)
 * DoS on other systems (if parsing system is allowed to establish
   TCP connections to other systems)
 * NTLM authentication material theft by initiating UNC file access to
   systems under attacker control (far fetched?)
 * Doomsday scenario: A widely deployed and highly connected application
   vulnerable to this attack may be used for DDoS.

Products review:
 Several SOAP and XMLRPC implementation were found vulnerable. I will
 be contacting their respective authors directly. It will be up to
 those authors to publish the patches and/or advisories.

 The following implementations were found NOT vulnerable and the reasons
 contributing to their resistance were researched.

Java:
  Apache XML-RPC server is NOT vulnerable in the default configuration
  due to its use of MinML parser which doesn't support external entities.
  Yet should be vulnerable if used with a full blown parser like Xerces
  or Crimson. To make it invulnerable in all configurations it needs to
  explicitly setup an EntityResolver that aborts having found external
  entities.

  Marqu?e XML-RPC also uses MinML and thus is NOT vulnerable.

  XMLRPC-J uses freeDOM that only supports Minimal XML which
  lacks entity references (http://www.docuverse.com/smldev/minxml.jsp)

  WebLogic 6.1sp3 SOAP implementation was NOT found vulnerable. It
  appears to be using a parser that ignores entities altogether. Ignorance
  is bliss...

Python:
 Python 2.2 SimpleXMLRPCServer does NOT seem to be vulnerable. It can use
 multiple different parsers:
  * xmllib.XMLParser is the default one shipped with Python. It
    doesn't implement processing of doctype definition and thus doesn't
    understand external entities defined in there
  * ExpatParser is used when expat python-expat is installed,
    it understands the references but seems to replace them with
    empty strings unconditionally. This negates the attack.
  * SGMLOP parser, judging by comments in its source doesn't recognize
    external entities
  * FastParser was not available for inspection

Acknowledgments:
 Even though the issue was discovered and researched independently I
 cannot claim to be the first one to realize the risks associated with
 XML external entities. E.g. RFC 2518 discusses the issue in section
 17.7 Implications of XML External Entities.

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