Message-ID: <NEBBICPLGHJNDCJBNFJNKELDDFAA.jim@becher.net>
From: jim at becher.net (Jim Becher)
Subject: Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco ONS15454 and Cisco ONS15327 Vulnerabilities

	The issue described in CSCds52295 was reported to Cisco and Cerent on Nov
15, 2000 (15454s running 2.1.3 and 2.2).  I had been exchanging e-mail with
Cisco for 6 months after the initial report.  We deleted files, and I think
the TCC cards had to be RMA'd to Cisco.  Two other issues were also reported
at the same time... I will have to look and see if they were covered in a
previous announcement.

	We also found issues with some other optical gear from a couple of other
vendors.  ONI fixed at least one issue we reported to them back in Sept
2000.  Not sure whatever happened to the Sycamore stuff -- IIRC, the
Sycamore platforms were built on a default Redhat 6.1 installation.



-jim

-----Original Message-----
From: full-disclosure-admin@...ts.netsys.com
[mailto:full-disclosure-admin@...ts.netsys.com]On Behalf Of Cisco
Systems Product Security Incident Response Team
Sent: Thursday, October 31, 2002 10:00 AM
To: full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com
Cc: psirt@...co.com
Subject: [Full-Disclosure] Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco ONS15454 and
Cisco ONS15327 Vulnerabilities


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

   Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco ONS15454 and Cisco ONS15327
Vulnerabilities

Revision 1.0

  For Public Release 2002 October 31 at 1600 UTC

     ----------------------------------------------------------------------

Contents

   Summary
   Affected Products
   Details
   Impact
   Software Versions and Fixes
   Obtaining Fixed Software
   Workarounds
   Exploitation and Public Announcements
   Status of This Notice
   Distribution
   Revision History
   Cisco Security Procedures

     ----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary

   Multiple vulnerabilities exist in the Cisco ONS15454 optical transport
   platform and the Cisco ONS15327 edge optical transport platform. All
Cisco
   ONS software releases earlier than 3.4 are vulnerable.

   The Cisco ONS15454E is affected only by CSCdx82962.

   These vulnerabilities are documented as Cisco bug ID CSCds52295,
   CSCdt84146, CSCdv62307, CSCdw15690, CSCdx82962 and CSCdy70756. There are
   workarounds available to mitigate the effects of these vulnerabilities.

   This advisory will be posted at
   http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/ons-multiple-vuln-pub.shtml.

Affected Products

   All Cisco ONS15454 and ONS15327 hardware running Cisco ONS releases
   earlier than 3.4 are affected by these vulnerabilities.

   Hardware not affected includes the Cisco ONS15540 extended service
   platform, ONS15800 series, ONS15200 series metro DWDM systems and the
   ONS15194 IP transport concentrator.

   The Cisco ONS15454E is affected only by CSCdx82962.

   No other Cisco product is currently known to be affected by these
   vulnerabilities.

   To determine your software revision, view the help-about window on the
CTC
   network management software.

Details

   The ONS hardware is managed via the TCC, TCC+, TCCi or the XTC control
   cards which are usually connected to a network isolated from the Internet
   and local to the customer's environment. This limits the exposure to the
   exploitation of the vulnerabilites from the Internet.

   These vulnerabilities are documented as Cisco bug ID CSCds52295,
   CSCdt84146, CSCdv62307, CSCdw15690, CSCdx82962 and CSCdy70756, which
   requires a CCO account to view and can be viewed after 2002 November 1 at
   1600 UTC.

   CSCds52295
           It is possible to open a FTP connection to the TCC, TCC+ or XTC
           using any nonexistent user-name and password. In order to exploit
           this vulnerability a person must be able to establish a FTP
           connection to the TCC, TCC+ or XTC.

   CSCdt84146
           User-names and passwords are stored in clear text in the running
           image database of the TCC, TCC+ or XTC. In order to exploit this
           vulnerability a person needs access to the backup of the image
           database.

   CSCdv62307
           The SNMP community string "public" cannot be changed in the Cisco
           ONS software. In order to exploit this vulnerability a person
must
           be able to establish a SNMP connection to the TCC, TCC+ or XTC.

   CSCdw15690
           Requesting an invalid CORBA Interoperable Object Reference (IOR)
           via HTTP may cause the TCC, TCC+ or XTC to reset. In order to
           exploit this vulnerability a person must be able to establish a
           HTTP connection to the TCC, TCC+ or XTC.

   CSCdx82962
           HTTP requests starting with any character other than '/' may
cause
           the TCC, TCC+, TCCi or XTC to reset. In order to exploit this
           vulnerability a person must be able to establish a HTTP
connection
           to the TCC, TCC+ or XTC.

   CSCdy70756
           The TCC, TCC+ and XTC have a user-name and password that can be
           used to gain access to the underlying VxWorks Operating System
and
           it is not possible to change or disable this account. In order to
           exploit this vulnerability a person must be able to establish a
           Telnet connection to TCC, TCC+ or XTC.

Impact

   CSCds52295
           Once a FTP connection has been opened a person could upload
           modified configuration files and delete software images from the
           TCC, TCC+ or XTC.

   CSCdt84146
           By analyzing an offline database backup of the TCC, TCC+ or XTC,
           it is possible to extract user-name and password pairs. Using the
           administrator password a person can access the TCC, TCC+ or XTC
           either remotely or locally and gain complete control over the
           Cisco ONS platform.

   CSCdv62307
           By using the SNMP read-only community string a person may gain
           unauthorized access to information in the SNMP MIBs on the TCC,
           TCC+ or XTC. User-names and passwords cannot be extracted using
           this method.

   CSCdw15690
           By requesting an invalid CORBA IOR object via HTTP a person may
           cause the TCC, TCC+ or XTC to reset. This does not impact the
           traffic already flowing through the switch.

   CSCdx82962
           By requesting URLs starting with a character other than '/' via
           HTTP a person may cause the TCC, TCC+, TCCi or XTC to reset. This
           does not impact the traffic already flowing through the switch.

   CSCdy70756
           Using the VxWorks OS account a person can access the TCC, TCC+ or
           XTC either remotely or locally and gain complete control over the
           Cisco ONS platform.

Software Versions and Fixes

   All vulnerabilities are fixed in the Cisco ONS software release 3.4 and
   later for the TCC+ installed in the ONS 15454, the TCCi installed in the
   ONS 15454E and the XTC installed in the ONS 15327. For the TCC control
   cards, the Cisco ONS software release 2.3.3 will be available on CCO on
   November 4, 2002.

   The procedure to upgrade to the fixed software version on the Cisco ONS
   15454 is detailed at

http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/ong/15400/r34dohcs/procedur/
r34pctc.htm.

   The procedure to upgrade to the fixed software version on the Cisco ONS
   15327 is detailed at

http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/ong/15327/r34userd/2734ctc.h
tm.

Obtaining Fixed Software

   Cisco is offering free software upgrades to address these vulnerabilities
   for all affected customers. Customers may only install and expect support
   for the feature sets they have purchased.

   Customers with service contracts should contact their regular update
   channels to obtain the free software upgrade identified via this
advisory.
   For most customers with service contracts, this means that upgrades
should
   be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at
   http://www.cisco.com/kobayashi/sw-center/sw-optical.shtml.

   Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through a prior
   or existing agreement with third-party support organizations such as
Cisco
   Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that
   support organization for assistance with obtaining the free software
   upgrade(s).

   Customers who purchased directly from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco
   service contract, and customers who purchase through third party vendors
   but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through their point of
   sale, should obtain fixed software by contacting the Cisco Technical
   Assistance Center (TAC) using the contact information listed below. In
   these cases, customers are entitled to obtain an upgrade to a later
   version of the same release or as indicated by the applicable corrected
   software version in the Software Versions and Fixes section (noted
above).

   Cisco TAC contacts are as follows:

     * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
     * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
     * e-mail: tac@...co.com

   See http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml for
   additional TAC contact information, including special localized telephone
   numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various
   languages.

   Please have your product serial number available and give the URL of this
   advisory as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade.

   Please do not contact either "psirt@...co.com" or
   "security-alert@...co.com" for software upgrades.

Workarounds

   CSCds52295

           Restrict FTP traffic to the gateway node(s) with a router
           configured to restrict FTP access to the TCC, TCC+ or XTC so that
           FTP access is only allowed from authorized workstations. This can
           be done by adding Access Control Lists and turning on Unicast
           Reverse Path Forwarding on the router.

           Please note, this will not prevent spoofed IP packets, from the
           local segment, with the source IP address set to that of the
           authorized workstation from reaching the TCC, TCC+ or XTC.

   CSCdt84146

           It is possible to mitigate the effects of this vulnerability by
           making sure that the backup Cisco ONS images from the TCC, TCC+
or
           XTC are secure from unauthorized access.

   CSCdv62307

           Restrict SNMP traffic to the gateway node(s) with a router
           configured to restrict SNMP access to the TCC, TCC+ or XTC so
that
           SNMP access is only allowed from valid network management
           workstations. This can be done by adding Access Control Lists and
           turning on Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding on the router.

           Please note, this will not prevent spoofed IP packets, from the
           local segment, with the source IP address set to that of the
           network management station from reaching the TCC, TCC+ or XTC.

   CSCdw15690

           Restrict HTTP traffic to the gateway node(s) with a router
           configured to restrict HTTP access to the TCC, TCC+ or XTC so
that
           HTTP access is only allowed from valid network management
           workstations. This can be done by adding Access Control Lists and
           turning on Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding on the router.

           Please note, this will not prevent spoofed IP packets, from the
           local segment, with the source IP address set to that of the
           network management station from reaching the TCC, TCC+ or XTC.

   CSCdx82962

           Restrict HTTP traffic to the gateway node(s) with a router
           configured to restrict HTTP access to the TCC, TCC+ or XTC so
that
           HTTP access is only allowed from valid network management
           workstations. This can be done by adding Access Control Lists and
           turning on Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding on the router.

           Please note, this will not prevent spoofed IP packets, from the
           local segment, with the source IP address set to that of the
           network management station from reaching the TCC, TCC+ or XTC.

   CSCdy70756

           Restrict Telnet traffic to the gateway node(s) with a router
           configured to restrict Telnet access to the TCC, TCC+ or XTC so
           that Telnet access is only allowed from authorized workstations.
           This can be done by adding Access Control Lists and turning on
           Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding on the router.

           Please note, this will not prevent spoofed IP packets, from the
           local segment, with the source IP address set to that of the
           workstation from reaching the TCC, TCC+ or XTC.

Exploitation and Public Announcements

   All defects were reported to Cisco by customers. The Cisco PSIRT is not
   aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerabilities
   described in this advisory.

Status of This Notice: FINAL

   This is a final advisory. Although Cisco cannot guarantee the accuracy of
   all statements in this advisory, all of the facts have been checked to
the
   best of our ability. Cisco does not anticipate issuing updated versions
of
   this advisory unless there is some material change in the facts. Should
   there be a significant change in the facts, Cisco may update this
   advisory.

   A stand-alone copy or paraphrase of the text of this security advisory
   that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an
   uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual
   errors.

Distribution

   This advisory will be posted on Cisco's worldwide website at
   http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/ons-multiple-vuln-pub.shtml.

   In addition to worldwide website posting, a text version of this advisory
   is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key having the fingerprint FEB1
   1B89 A64B 60BB 4770 D1CE 93D2 FF06 F236 759C and is posted to the
   following e-mail and Usenet news recipients:

     * cust-security-announce@...co.com
     * bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
     * full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com
     * first-teams@...st.org (includes CERT/CC)
     * cisco-nsp@...k.nether.net
     * cisco@...t.colorado.edu
     * comp.dcom.sys.cisco
     * Various internal Cisco mailing lists

   Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
   worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing
   lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to
   check the above URL for any updates.

Revision History

   +--------------------------------------------------------------------+
   | Revision 1.0 | 31-October-2003 | Initial public release.           |
   +--------------------------------------------------------------------+

Cisco Security Procedures

   Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
   products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering
to
   receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's
worldwide
   website at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt. This includes instructions for
   press inquiries regarding Cisco security advisories.

     ----------------------------------------------------------------------

   This notice is Copyright 2002 by Cisco Systems, Inc. This notice may be
   redistributed freely after the release date given at the top of the text,
   provided that redistributed copies are complete and unmodified, and
   include all date and version information.

     ----------------------------------------------------------------------

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