[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20021207011009.GS24869@ifokr.org>
From: full-disclosure at ifokr.org (Brian Hatch)
Subject: UN support for "security by obscurity"
> Another data point in the full-disclosure/security-by-obscurity debate:
...
> The United States, Russia, and other countries are concerned about
> releasing information that would provide "a training manual for how to
> build weapons of mass destruction," a Western diplomatic source told
> CNN.
In the computer world we say relying on security through obscurity
is bad.[1] However in this case I might agree with them. It's a
very different situation.
We constantly argue that Open Source makes a level playing field, and
makes it more possible for us to secure our code. If a bug is found,
we can all fix it in the source even before our vendor supplies a new
version, for example. If someone writes an exploit, we can use it
in legitimate ways test our servers for weakness and fix them.
I don't think comparing code to nuclear 'secrets' is the same thing.
Does publishing the recipe for a bomb make it easier for me to secure
anything? We know that big bomb == lots of distruction. We can prepare
for lots of distruction equally without ever having the instructions
to create the bomb itself.
I wouldn't call this security through obscurity.
I cannot think of a legitimate reason that I'd need the 'code' for
a missle -- if I want to secure my house from missle attack, I know
the results a missle would have. I'd be vaporized. No amount of
knowledge about the makings of a nuke would help me there.
I can see a reason I need the code for Apache. That's something I
use that I can effectively defend from attackers.
And just to continue the analogy, those who posses nuclear technologies may
consider themselves the white hats, and want to keep that knowledge
from the black hats. Of course the'd define black hats as
everyone except themselves.
[1] *Relying* on security through obscurity is bad.
However *adding* security through obscurity is good.
This distinction is too often overlooked. Why say "I'm
running Apache 1.2.26 with mod_perl and mod_ssl version
BLAH" when you can just say "Apache"? It only makes it
easier for crackers to mark you down on their well-
tailored lists.
--
Brian Hatch Anxiously awaiting
Systems and the millenium so
Security Engineer I can start programming
http://www.ifokr.org/bri/ dates with 2-digits again.
Every message PGP signed
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: not available
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 240 bytes
Desc: not available
Url : http://lists.grok.org.uk/pipermail/full-disclosure/attachments/20021206/2d7e5549/attachment.bin
Powered by blists - more mailing lists