full-disclosure - Re: [VulnWatch] Password Disclosure in Cryptainer

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Message-ID: <000401c2a566$458beb00$1400020a@chaser>
From: kurt at seifried.org (Kurt Seifried)
Subject: Re: [VulnWatch] Password Disclosure in Cryptainer

Uhh, you do not strictly need physical access. Simple scenarios:

Remote administrative access, does a memory dump.

Laptop or desktop system that supports suspend mode, when in suspend the
contents of memory are written to the harddrive. When brought out of suspend
this data is "deleted" (i.e. the space is marked as free), an attacker could
potentially find the password somewhere on the HD.

System crash in WIndows NT/2000/XP where the person has configured it to
write a memory dump, the attacker could trigger this system crash (and the
resulting memory dump). How many people actually bother to delete emory
dumps after a crash? I thought so.

Data deletion/wiping/protection is a LOT harder then most people think. A
powerpoint of the talk I gave at Hivercon is available at:

http://www.hivercon.com/hc02/talk-seifried.htm

Quite a few technical remote attack scenarios. To say nothing of Legal based
local attacks.

My advice: use a product with a good security track record like PGP and not
these "no-name/generic" apps that 9 times out of 10 are broken beyond
belief.

Kurt Seifried, kurt@...fried.org
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http://seifried.org/security/