Message-ID: <200303161506.h2GF6Dsa009933@mailserver2.hushmail.com>
From: hack4life at hushmail.com (hack4life@...hmail.com)
Subject: Overflow in SunRPC-derived XDR libraries

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Original release date: March xx, 2003
Last revised: --
Source: CERT/CC

A complete revision history can be found at the end of this file.

Systems Affected

Applications using vulnerable implementations of SunRPC-derived XDR
libraries, which include, but are not limited to:
* Sun Microsystems network services library (libnsl)
* BSD-derived libraries with XDR/RPC routines (libc)
* GNU C library with sunrpc (glibc)

Overview

There is an integer overflow present in the xdrmem_getbytes() function
distributed as part of the Sun Microsystems [1]XDR library. This
overflow has been shown to lead to remotely exploitable buffer
overflows in multiple applications, leading to the execution of
arbitrary code. Although the library was originally distributed by Sun
Microsystems, multiple vendors have included the vulnerable code in
their own implementations.

I. Description

The XDR (external data representation) libraries are used to provide
platform-independent methods for sending data from one system process
to another, typically over a network connection. Such routines are
commonly used in remote procedure call ([2]RPC) implementations to
provide transparency to application programmers who need to use common
interfaces to interact with many different types of systems. The
xdrmem_getbytes() function in the XDR library provided by Sun
Microsystems contains an [3]integer overflow that can lead to
improperly sized dynamic memory allocation. Subsequent problems like
buffer overflows may result, depending on how and where the vulnerable
xdrmem_getbytes() function is used.

This issue is currently being tracked as [4]VU#516825 by the CERT/CC
and [5]CAN-2003-0028 in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
dictionary.

Note that this vulnerability is similar to, but distinct from,
[6]VU#192995.

II. Impact

Because SunRPC-derived XDR libraries are used by a variety of vendors
in a variety of applications, this defect may lead to a number of
differing security problems. Exploiting this vulnerability will lead
to denial of service, execution of arbitrary code, or the disclosure
of sensitive information.

Specific impacts reported include the ability to crash the rpcbind
service and possibly execute arbitrary code with root privileges. In
addition, intruders may be able to crash the MIT KRB5 kadmind or cause
it to leak sensitive information, such as secret keys.

III. Solution

Apply a patch from your vendor

[7]Appendix A contains information provided by vendors for this
advisory. As vendors report new information to the CERT/CC, we will
update this section and note the changes in our revision history. If a
particular vendor is not listed below or in the [8]vulnerability note,
we have not received their comments. Please contact your vendor
directly.

Note that XDR libraries can be used by multiple applications on most
systems. It may be necessary to upgrade or apply multiple patches and
then recompile statically linked applications.

Applications that are statically linked must be recompiled using
patched libraries. Applications that are dynamically linked do not
need to be recompiled; however, running services need to be restarted
in order to use the patched libraries.

System administrators should consider the following process when
addressing this issue:
1. Patch or obtain updated XDR/RPC libraries.
2. Restart any dynamically linked services that make use of the
XDR/RPC libraries.
3. Recompile any statically linked applications using the patched or
updated XDR/RPC libraries.

Disable access to vulnerable services or applications

Until patches are available and can be applied, you may wish to
disable access to services or applications compiled with the
vulnerable xdrmem_getbytes() function.

As a best practice, the CERT/CC recommends disabling all services that
are not explicitly required.

Appendix A. - Vendor Information

This appendix contains information provided by vendors for this
advisory. As vendors report new information to the CERT/CC, we will
update this section and note the changes in our revision history. If a
particular vendor is not listed below or in the individual
[9]vulnerability notes, we have not received their comments.

[VENDOR DETAILS OMITTED FROM DRAFT --CERT/CC]
_________________________________________________________________

Appendix B. - References

1. [18]VU#192995
2. [19]VU#516825
3. [20]RFC1831
4. [21]RFC1832
_________________________________________________________________

Thanks to Riley Hassell of [22]eEye Digital Security for discovering
and reporting this vulnerability. Thanks also to Sun Microsystems for
additional technical details.
_________________________________________________________________

Authors: [23]Chad Dougherty and Jeffrey Havrilla

Copyright 2003 Carnegie Mellon University.

Revision History
Mar xx, 2003: Initial release

References

1. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1832.txt
2. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1831.txt
3. http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/516825
4. http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/516825
5. http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2003-0028
6. http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/192995
7. file://localhost/XDR.html#vendors
8. http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/516825
9. http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/
[VENDOR LINKS OMITTED FROM DRAFT --CERT/CC]
18. http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/192995
19. http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/516825
20. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1831.txt
21. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1832.txt
22. http://www.eeye.com/
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