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Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20030324170720.05cded68@yoshimo.webtechs.idg.nl>
From: msopacua at idg.nl (Melvyn Sopacua)
Subject: Vulnerability (critical): Digital
signature for Adobe Acrobat/Reader plug-in can be forged
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At 13:02 3/24/2003, Vladimir Katalov wrote:
> However, the implementation of certification mechanism is weak, and
> it is
> easy to write a plug-in that will look like one certified by Adobe,
> and so
> will be loaded even in 'trusted' mode. Such plug-in can execute ANY
> code
> -- i.e. perform file operations (read/write/execute), access Windows
> Registry etc.
[ ... ]
> 3. 'Trusted' mode is activated automatically by Adobe Acrobat/Reader
> when it loads documents that are protected using various DRM
> (Digital
> Rights Management) schemes such as WebBuy, InterTrust DocBox etc --
> to
> prevent protected contect from being saved with protection stripped.
> However, a plug-in with 'fake' certificate can be loaded anyway, and
> so it will be able to do anything with DRM-protected documents, e.g.
> altering or removing security options.
Q: how is the chicken and egg problem circumvented here? Social
Engineering?
Or is there a similar mechaniscm like HTML Object tags, where plugin
urls are
embedded in the document and (semi-) automically installed?
Met vriendelijke groeten / With kind regards,
Webmaster IDG.nl
Melvyn Sopacua
<@JE> Hosting: $5 per month. Domain name: $15, your site being down
twice a week: Priceless.
http://www.bash.org/?42663
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