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Message-ID: <825BF17A41B1F64F943D3A1B7D47EF320146A3@excelsior.ad.syseng.com>
From: charrington at syseng.com (Christopher Harrington)
Subject: MSN Webcam / Chat Spoof

If more clients had embraced OCSP, SCVP, CAM or some other form of
certificate validation, the size of the CRL would be irrelevant. An OCSP
request is only 2kb for example.
 
--Chris

-----Original Message-----
From: Steve Poirot [mailto:poirotsj@....net] 
Sent: Tuesday, May 13, 2003 1:45 PM
To: full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com
Subject: Re: [Full-Disclosure] MSN Webcam / Chat Spoof


I don't know about IE, but with Netscape you can import the CRLs and
arrange for automatic updates with the maximum frequency being once per
day.

John.Airey@...b.org.uk wrote:


Because Thawte don't have the hardware capabilities to do this. I'd asked
them this before and they told me it would be too difficult to set this
up. Even if they did, imagine how much network traffic would be required
for verifying every certificate worldwide?
 
PKI as it is set up at the moment is as useful as the British MOT test.
All it says is that on a given day your identity (or car) was
satisfactorily inspected. The other 364 (or 365) days anything could
happen.
 
-
John Airey, BSc (Jt Hons), CNA, RHCE
Internet systems support officer, ITCSD, Royal National Institute of the
Blind,
Bakewell Road, Peterborough PE2 6XU,
Tel.: +44 (0) 1733 375299 Fax: +44 (0) 1733 370848 John.Airey@...b.org.uk

Appeasement is the policy of being nice to a crocodile in the hope that he
will eat you last. (Winston Churchill)



-----Original Message-----
From: Richard M. Smith [mailto:rms@...puterbytesman.com]
Sent: 12 May 2003 18:09
To: full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com
Subject: RE: [Full-Disclosure] MSN Webcam / Chat Spoof


The other problem with Authenticode is that certifcates aren't revokable.
Why doesn't IE go back to Thawte to see if the "Browser Plugin"
certificate is still valid?
 
Richard

-----Original Message-----
From: full-disclosure-admin@...ts.netsys.com
[mailto:full-disclosure-admin@...ts.netsys.com] On Behalf Of Daniel
Docekal
Sent: Monday, May 12, 2003 11:38 AM
To: 'Richard M. Smith'; full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com
Subject: RE: [Full-Disclosure] MSN Webcam / Chat Spoof


Sure Richard it is actually loader of dialer program itself - it even
updates itself any time it wants and it does anything it wants. And there
thousands of people who had this bad luck to "use" that kind of software
without properly realising what they are doing.
 
Concerning that certifitace - stop trusting things which cannot be
trusted. Would be any COmpany/Street text something you can trust? Would
it change any time that company relocates? 
 
It's problem of Microsoft who made this "authenticode" verification so
misguided and people that they even trust to that. Actually one should not
trust to anything that is not personally known to him...

-----Original Message-----
From: full-disclosure-admin@...ts.netsys.com
[mailto:full-disclosure-admin@...ts.netsys.com] On Behalf Of Richard M.
Smith
Sent: Monday, May 12, 2003 4:10 PM
To: full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com
Subject: RE: [Full-Disclosure] MSN Webcam / Chat Spoof


The downloaded ActiveX file can be found at this URL:
http://80.96.118.2/ac/mw/MSN_QTPieJess1.exe
 
I ran a strings on the file and the control is called:  TIBS Loader module
and the ProgID is LoaderCon.LoaderCon.  I can't find anything on the Web
about this particular ActiveX control, but it wouldn't surprise me that it
is part of some sort adult dialer scheme.  The control appears to be more
of a downloader program and not the adult dialer itself.
 
My question:  Why can't an Authenticode certificate present the following
information to a user:
 
   - Company name
   - Street address
   - Phone number
   - Web site URL
   - Contact Email address
   - Company logo
   - Link to a product description page
 
All this information can be verified when a company applies for a
Authenticode signing tool.  The current scheme is just plain silly as this
MSN scam illustrates.  There is simply no way to verify where a piece of
software is really coming from.
 
Richard 
 

-----Original Message-----
From: full-disclosure-admin@...ts.netsys.com
[mailto:full-disclosure-admin@...ts.netsys.com] On Behalf Of Daniel
Do?ekal
Sent: Monday, May 12, 2003 2:08 AM
To: full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com
Subject: RE: [Full-Disclosure] MSN Webcam / Chat Spoof


Browser Plugin is ADULT DIALER - it connects via modem to telephone
service and you pay your sexy adventure through your telephone bill. In
many cases, there are adult dialers committing fraud - they redirect your
dial-up internet connection to very expensive number without your
knowledge. 

-----Original Message-----
From: full-disclosure-admin@...ts.netsys.com
[mailto:full-disclosure-admin@...ts.netsys.com] On Behalf Of Richard M.
Smith
Sent: Monday, May 12, 2003 3:40 AM
To: full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com; secure@...rosoft.com
Subject: RE: [Full-Disclosure] MSN Webcam / Chat Spoof


You missed the good part.  If you actually go to the "MSN" Web site and
press the "Connect Now" button, the site tries to download some
questionable ActiveX control.  Not to worry however:
 
   Just press YES in the dialog box when it appears. This operation is
totally safe and certified by Microsoft Authenticode(tm)
 
The control is signed by "Browser Plugin".  I guess Thawte will give
anyone an Authenticode certificate nowadays.  I wonder who "Browser
Plugin" really is?
 
 


- 


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