full-disclosure - Solaris syslogd overflow

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Message-ID: <20030604235822.GB36470@redundancy.redundancy.org>
From: lx at redundancy.redundancy.org (David Thiel)
Subject: Solaris syslogd overflow

Synopsis:

	Solaris syslogd is vulnerable to a remote buffer overflow.

Versions:

	Solaris 2.6 	SPARC:	Not vulnerable
	Solaris 2.7 SPARC/x86:	Untested
	Solaris 8   	SPARC:	Vulnerable
	Solaris 8     	  x86:	Vulnerable
	Solaris 9   	SPARC:	Not vulnerable
	Solaris 9   	  x86:	Untested

Impact:

	Low-Medium.

	While I've not been able to craft an exploit that successfully
	executes arbitrary code, it may still be possible.  If
	not, this can be used to hide evidence of attack or intrusion
	in environments where a central logging server is used.

Description:

	In Solaris 8, syslogd dumps core when receiving a UDP packet
	larger than 1024 bytes, instead of truncating it, as dictated
	by RFC3164, section 6.1.

Fix:

	Sun Microsystems released patch 110945-08 for SPARC and
	110946 for x86, which resolves this problem (identified as
	bug #4812764) on 2003-05-29.  Obviously, any systems not
	using syslogd to log from remote hosts should be run with
	the -t flag.  Alternatively, consider switching to a more
	reliable logging system, such as Gerrit Pape's socklog.

Timeline:

	2003-01-18:	Problem discovered, platforms tested.
	2003-01-21:	Sun Security Coordination Team notified.
	2003-02-04:	Sun confirms the problem and assigns bug ID.
	2003-05-29:	Patch released.

References:

	http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/findPatch.pl?patchId=110945&rev=08

If anyone else is able to do anything more interesting with this bug,
I'd like to hear about it.

Cheers,
lx

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