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Message-ID: <1059279612.1994.34.camel@localhost>
From: pauls at utdallas.edu (Paul Schmehl)
Subject: DCOM RPC exploit (dcom.c)
On Sat, 2003-07-26 at 22:29, Ron DuFresne wrote:
>
> I'm just trying to understand how corporate networks would/should be at
> risk with this, why port 135 would not be filtered already limiting
> exposure. Is there a reason why it would not be that I'm missing?
Are you really serious? Recall Slammer? There were networks that were
locked down pretty tight. Slammer couldn't get in, right? Then one
developer who got his unpatched copy of SQL inside the network, by
logging in through VPN with his infected laptop, took the entire network
down.
You can't get in to our network on those ports either - unless you're
already in. But I can guarantee you that we'll be chasing infected
boxes down for days after the worm hits. And we've already patched
everything that we could patch. I scan for Slammer every week, because
every week someone new decides to install SQL unpatched or some stupid
app that has an unpatched copy of MSDE. Now I'll be chasing the RPC
worm around too.
You can't firewall 135 inside your network or you'd have no network.
The only reason I read lists like this is because I need to know before
it hits what the next stupid exploit is that I have to deal with. And
every one is a royal PITA. I put virus and worm writers right there in
the same pile with spammers. They're all the scum of the earth. Clear
examples of the worst of human nature.
--
Paul Schmehl (pauls@...allas.edu)
Adjunct Information Security Officer
The University of Texas at Dallas
AVIEN Founding Member
http://www.utdallas.edu/~pauls/
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