full-disclosure - DCOM RPC exploit (dcom.c)

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Message-ID: <200307270452.h6R4qEKp015634@turing-police.cc.vt.edu>
From: Valdis.Kletnieks at vt.edu (Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu)
Subject: DCOM RPC exploit (dcom.c) 

On Sat, 26 Jul 2003 22:29:56 CDT, Ron DuFresne said:
> I'm just trying to understand how corporate networks would/should be at
> risk with this, why port 135 would not be filtered already limiting
> exposure.  Is there a reason why it would not be that I'm missing?  The

It's the rare corporate net indeed that doesn't have a single remotely
exploitable copy of IE or Outlook left in its entire address space.

And Slammer proved quite well that having a firewall doesn't stop squat.
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