full-disclosure - [inbox] Re: Reacting to a server compromise

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Message-ID: <00ab01c35ab4$c704f5b0$172ea8c0@LUFKIN.DPSOL.COM>
From: purdy at tecman.com (Curt Purdy)
Subject: [inbox] Re: Reacting to a server compromise

Doing a disk dd with *NIX or a bitwise ghost does not compromise the data
(other than in the quantum sense of not being able to observe an electron
without changing it's orbit). If this is the rigor you would impose then any
copying including your "specialized police hardware", would fall under the
same restriction.  Although I am not familiar with this hardware, most law
inforcement I know use Encase, a $30K dd with a few analysis tools thrown
in.

Curt Purdy CISSP, GSEC, MCSE+I, CNE, CCDA
Information Security Engineer
DP Solutions

----------------------------------------

If you spend more on coffee than on IT security, you will be hacked.
What's more, you deserve to be hacked.
-- White House cybersecurity adviser Richard Clarke

-----Original Message-----
From: full-disclosure-admin@...ts.netsys.com
[mailto:full-disclosure-admin@...ts.netsys.com]On Behalf Of Alexandre
Dulaunoy
Sent: Sunday, August 03, 2003 2:01 PM
To: devnull@...imus.com.au
Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com
Subject: [inbox] [Full-Disclosure] Re: Reacting to a server compromise

On 03/Aug/03 12:33 +1000, devnull@...imus.com.au wrote:
> On Sun, 3 Aug 2003 01:38 am, Jennifer Bradley wrote:
>
> > If this happens again, I would probably make a copy of the hard drive,
> > or at the very least the log files since they can be entered as
> > evidence of a hacked box.
>
> Under most jurisdictions, an ordinary disk image produced by Norton Ghost
etc
> using standard hardware is completely inadmissible in court, as it is
> impossible to make one without possibly compromising the integrity of the
> evidence. The police etc use specialised hardware for making such copies,
> which ensures that the disk can't have been altered.

Getting evidence  by reading (via  any software or  hardware solution)
may compromise the integrity of the evidence. I would like to know the
difference between  for example a  (s)dd and the  specialised hardware
that you talk about ? Do you have any references ?

Preserving  the  scene integrity  is  really  difficult.  You have  to
minimize the  intrusion to the  scene. On computer hardware  is really
difficult...  Using a hardware device that doesn't change too much the
scene is difficult... (think of a compromised disk firmware).

And  the worst,  sometimes  we  see something  that  doesn't exist  at
all. Forensic analysis is the land of illusion...

just my .02 EUR.

adulau

--
-- 	  	     Alexandre Dulaunoy (adulau) -- http://www.foo.be/
-- 	   http://pgp.ael.be:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x44E6CBCD
-- 	   "Knowledge can create problems, it is not through ignorance
-- 				  that we can solve them" Isaac Asimov