full-disclosure - Re: Reacting to a server compromise

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Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.96.1030804221558.18384D-100000@shell.datasync.com>
From: infotek at datasync.com (Jason Ellison)
Subject: Re: Reacting to a server compromise

 There was a good article presented at USENIX once "Secure Deletion of
Data from Magnetic and Solid-State Memory". It is a very good read and
very in depth.

http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/secure_del.html

 I was just talking to a friend of mine last night about this. He was
called in to an FBI situation in which he was making a copy of an HD for
the defense. The FBI loaded some software (by booting off a floppy) prior
to allowing him to copy data off of the machine. He was told by the agents
that the software made the disk read-only. He was observed by the agents
duing the copy process. Is the FBI still operating like this?

Jason Ellison