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Message-ID: <3F3E5FC1.21370.164510F@localhost>
From: cta at hcsin.net (Bernie, CTA)
Subject: east coast powergrid / SCADA [OT?]

The theory that the Blackout event started by power generation 
loss (downed transmission lines) at a Cleveland plant is a 
little better then the lightning bolt Canada theory, but still 
inconsistent with the technical aspects of the Grids automated 
fault protection and power load balancing systems. Unless, of 
course, several other Power Plants and Sub Stations automated 
fault protection and power load balancing systems were taken 
offline, or their power cords cut.

1. If the components of the protection system were taken offline 
at near the same time, was it in response to the threat of the 
MSBlaster or RPC vulnerability in the OS that runs these 
components? If not, then why did these systems fail to operate? 
Was it human interdiction or error? On the other hand, was it a 
statistically improvable event where these systems all failed 
simultaneously? What were the system security and protection 
engineering team doing since 9/11?  

2. If their cords were cut at the same time, would it then be 
logical to consider the Blackout was a terrorist related planned 
incident? If so, where was the system security and protection 
engineering team since 9/11?  

3. Or, this entire Blackout was do to coincidental and 
simultaneous stresses in the Grids' infrastructure, and 
completely unexpected as the transmission lines and protection 
systems were to old to properly respond. That notion would be 
oxymoronic, lame, and not acceptable especially considering the 
sophistication of these facilities and the recent upgrades made 
to accommodate power line hosted Internet / communications.

As for the time span 14:06 - 15:21, well that just supports the 
theory that the safeguards did not properly function, option 1, 
or 2. If the time period was say a few seconds then maybe we can 
put some weight into the old and over-stressed technology 
theory.


On 16 Aug 2003 at 12:08, Geoff Shively wrote:

> NERC (nerc.com) North American Electric Reliability Council has a
> hidden report that states at "14:06 Chamberlain - Harding 345 Kv
> line tripped -- cause not reported". This was the first sign of
> failure. NE US and Canada did not report significant outages
> prior to 15:11.
> 
> Another point to look at is at "15:17 - 15:21 Numerous lines in
> Michigan tripped"
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> Geoff Shively, CHO
> PivX Solutions, LLC
> 
> http://www.pivx.com
> 
> ----- Original Message ----- 
> From: "Richard M. Smith" <rms@...puterbytesman.com>
> To: <full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com>
> Sent: Saturday, August 16, 2003 11:25 AM
> Subject: RE: [Full-Disclosure] east coast powergrid / SCADA [OT?]
> 
> 
> > Ground zero for the blackout seems to be Parma, OH according to
> > local papers and ABC News:
> >
> > http://abcnews.go.com/wire/US/ap20030816_755.html
> >
> > http://junior.apk.net/~jnoga/F16CAUSE.html
> >
> > http://www.toledoblade.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20030816/
> > NEWS08/10 8160106
> >
> > Richard
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: full-disclosure-admin@...ts.netsys.com
> > [mailto:full-disclosure-admin@...ts.netsys.com] On Behalf Of
> > Bernie, CTA Sent: Saturday, August 16, 2003 1:25 PM To:
> > full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com Subject: Re: [Full-Disclosure]
> > east coast powergrid / SCADA [OT?]
> >
> > I still feel that there was human intervention to disrupt or
> > otherwise circumvent the automatic safeguards, in response to
> > an anomaly (i.e. MSBlaster).
> >
> > ....
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> > Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
> >
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
> 

-
****************************************************
Bernie 
Chief Technology Architect
Chief Security Officer
cta@...in.net
Euclidean Systems, Inc.
*******************************************************
// "There is no expedient to which a man will not go 
//    to avoid the pure labor of honest thinking."   
//     Honest thought, the real business capital.    
//      Observe> Think> Plan> Think> Do> Think>      
*******************************************************



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