full-disclosure - Global *.net XSS, thank you Verisign(TM)

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Message-ID: <3F6753B0.4060107@djsnm.com>
From: djsnm at djsnm.com (Scott Manley)
Subject: Global *.net XSS, thank you Verisign(TM)

Richard M. Smith wrote:
> VeriSign should fix their bug, but I don't see the danger of a
> cross-site scripting error at a non-existent domain.  The scripting code
> can't really do anything at the Web site........
>

Indeed, but it is exploitable in some cases where the user is using an 
http proxy, since there are 2 url parsers involved. If anyone remembers 
the rather neat Analog-X/IE Global XSS you can probably find the same 
issue with almost any proxy.

I've not tested, but.... the Analog-X URL parser looks for a ':' or a 
'\' as a terminator for the domain name, while IE looks for any 
character which isn't part of a legal domain name.

So you can get cookies from *any* domain by doing things like

http://www.msn.com";alert('slut');".net

In theory IE parses this to the msn.com domain and the proxy parses this 
to the  www.msn.com";alert('slut');".net domain.

Again - it all depends on the proxy and the browser disagreeing on the 
URL parsing.

Scott Manley