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From: jkuperus at planet.nl (jelmer)
Subject: Winrar doesn't determine the actual size of
 compressed files

Speeking of which..

It also has the directory traversal bug described on

http://lists.insecure.org/lists/bugtraq/2003/May/0113.html

just test with the .zip file located there
tested on 3.20


----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Bipin Gautam" <door_hUNT3R@...ckcodemail.com>
To: <full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com>
Sent: Tuesday, September 09, 2003 1:01 PM
Subject: [Full-Disclosure] Winrar doesn't determine the actual size of
compressed files


> ---[ about WinRAR]---
> Winrar (http://www.rarsoft.com/) is one of the most popular file
compression utilities for Windows.
>
> --[summary]---
> Winrar incorrectly determines the actual size of compressed files saved in
.rar format by reading it's header information.
>
> --[details]--
> Recently we managed to devise a technique to spoof the header and creating
a valid CRC checksum. Later we found that Winrar only depends on it's header
information and CRC check sum to determine the size and integrity of .rar
files. Before uncompressing .rar files, Winrar pre-allocates space according
to the actual file size specified in the header to avoid fragmentation.But
pre-allocation occurs without checking the available hdd space. Then it goes
extracting, even if the hdd size is less than the size of the files.We did a
test by extracting 1GB files in a hdd with 700MB free space.
>
> Surprisingly, we later discover that even in detecting of header
corruption WinRAR doesn't enforce to avoid extraction process. this lead
WinRAR to believe that the actual size is correct .We managed to exploit
this and create a proof of concept to demonstrate this problem by changing
the actual file size in it's header. When it starts extracting it doesn't
find any valid data in the archive and on the basis of it's header it
attempts to extract 1 gigabyte of data and simply goes on writing "0x00"
filling up valuable hdd space.
>
> --[Proof of concept]-- 
> The proof of concept is a valid .rar file which is just 100 bytes but it's
header has been forged to fool Winrar into thinking that it's a 1 gigabyte
file by forging it's header and creating a valid CRC checksum. All versions
of Winrar (upto 3.20 - latest version till date) seem to be vulnerable.
>
> The proof of concept of .rar file can be obtained from the following URL:
http://www.geocities.com/visitbipin/test123.zip
> If you extract the file Winrar will try to extract this 100 bytes .rar
file trusting the information in it's header but not on the basis of it's
data integrity.
>
> --[Background Information]--
> This bug was originally discovered by hUNT3R, a member of 01 Security
Sumbission. The vendor was notified via email. Further discussion took place
in 01 Security Sumbission's forum with the developer of Winrar (Eugene
Roshal) :
> URL: http://www.ysgnet.com/phorum/read.php?f=1&i=341&t=324#reply_341
>
> ---[about 01 security submission]---
> 01s.s is a small group having experience as security specialists,
programmers and system administrators
> http://www.ysgnet.com/hn.
>
>
>
>        | .o?_Oo.h?UNTER.oO_?o. |
>       ?  !?007???????????9*??!  ?
>
> _____________________________________________________________
> Secure mail ---> http://www.blackcode.com
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html


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