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Open Source and information security mailing list archives
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Message-ID: <OF4AF65BB3.919E136D-ON85256DA9.008214D7-85256DA9.008388ED@fund.bisys.com> From: Jeffrey.Stebelton at bisys.com (Jeffrey.Stebelton@...ys.com) Subject: Is Marty Lying? "if you can set an IDS signature for something, then you shouldn't be vulnerable to it..... Useless." I don't know what kind of company you do security for, but mine has these prevalent security holes, also known as users. My IDS not only looks for the external attacks, the guy banging away at my FTP servers with Grims or running Whisker against my Web servers, but it also looks for the BackOrfice'd PC inside calling home. You know, the one caused when the guy on the second floor went to www.freesexfor everyone.com and downloaded what he thought was a screensaver of the tootsie flavor of the month. IDS is noisy, and it requires analysis, and yes, you see a lot of attempts against things that are already patched. But it also shows you who's doing recon, and the stealthy ones are the dangerous ones. That'll be the guy finding the FTP server some developer reloaded and forgot to tell you about, which now has a nice selection of first-run BiTTorrent movies available for download. It'll also detect the hack in North Korea looking for a misconfigured firewall object with NetBIOS ports enabled. And if you're telling me your environment is 100% patched all the time, then I'd say you don't have a whole lot servers you're responsible for. Useless? Not here. Jeff S |---------+--------------------------------------> | | security snot | | | <booger@...xclan.net> | | | Sent by: | | | full-disclosure-admin@...ts| | | .netsys.com | | | | | | | | | 09/22/2003 05:13 PM | | | | |---------+--------------------------------------> >---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | To: "Gregory A. Gilliss" <ggilliss@...publishing.com> | | cc: Peter Busser <peter@...steddebian.org>, full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com | | Subject: Re: [Full-Disclosure] Is Marty Lying? | >---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| "Detect intrusions" - if you can set an IDS signature for something, then you shouldn't be vulnerable to it. So the functionality of IDS is to tell you when you've been compromised by six-month old public vulnerabilities that dvdman has finally gotten his hands on an exploit for, that you never bothered to patch for? Useless. ----------------------------------------------------------- "Whitehat by day, booger at night - I'm the security snot." - CISSP / CCNA / A+ Certified - www.unixclan.net/~booger/ - ----------------------------------------------------------- On Mon, 22 Sep 2003, Gregory A. Gilliss wrote: > Peter: > > Intrusion Detection systems are designed to detect intrusions. Period. > No one AFAIK has yet developed the Intrusion Prediction system. If you > have an alpha version lying around, pls respond with a link. I'm sure > that you will quickly be deluged with download requests =;^) > > Reactive is the nature of the beast, a point that has been rehashed many > many times here and elsewhere. No finite state machine can anticipate or > detect the virus that I am right now writing, unless I foolishly make part > of the binary match an existing sig. there will *always* be a latency > between action and response. One of the things that people on this list > do is attempt to assist each other in minimizing that latency. > > Now, if we could only get some of the vendors onboard >-) > > G > > On or about 2003.09.22 21:23:52 +0000, Peter Busser (peter@...steddebian.org) said: > > > Hi! > > > > > > 3) Why the fuck do people still thing signature-based IDS is worthwhile? > > > Give us another solution. Are you saying anomoly based ids signatures are > > > _worthwhile_? > > > > The problem with IDS systems is the same problem that currently available > > virus scanners have: They work reactive and not proactive. > > > > Making machines harder to break into and improve ways to enforce a security > > policy (e.g. by using Mandatory Access Control (MAC)) would be one way to > > proactively deal with security. > > -- > Gregory A. Gilliss, CISSP Telephone: 1 650 872 2420 > Computer Engineering E-mail: greg@...liss.com > Computer Security ICQ: 123710561 > Software Development WWW: http://www.gilliss.com/greg/ > PGP Key fingerprint 2F 0B 70 AE 5F 8E 71 7A 2D 86 52 BA B7 83 D9 B4 14 0E 8C A3 > > _______________________________________________ > Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. > Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html > _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. 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