Message-ID: <ILDZIIGKIMMAMEP3OJLWB1B0H5KEJVGCKIJ4NRNT@ziplip.com>
From: mitch_hurrison at ziplip.com (mitch_hurrison@...lip.com)
Subject: No Subject (re: openssh exploit code?)

Hi Paul,

I'm glad to see you are capable of a sensible response. I see
your points and it's nothing I haven't heard before. The thing
is, your arguments don't really hold any ground in this particular
event. 

I've said all along that this issue has been publicly recognised
as being a security issue from the getgo. Besides my personal
beliefs that has been the main fuel behind my arguments against
exploit or practical exploit methodology disclosure for an issue that is potentially devastating.

Now you state the following:

> Again, you miss the point entirely.  The folks that have 
> asked you for more information are not looking for "fun".  
> They are trying to make real life decisions about taking down
> critical systems for **unscheduled downtime** to patch them.
>  You fail to understand that many admins can't simply take
> a system down because Mitch says they should.  They need solid
> arguments to take to their bosses to explain why this particular
> system needs to be downed *today* rather than waiting for a
> regularly scheduled maintenance window.  When a worm comes out,
> it's a no brainer. (But even then sometimes the bosses don't
> believe you until they've been burned at least once.) But admins
> can't take systems down every time someone cries "Patch now!
> This is exploitable!"

Your main argument being that you can't take some yahoo's word
for it when they claim this issue is exploitable. The thing is
you don't have to take some yahoo's word for it. 

Let me quote from CERT Advisory CA-2003-24:

"There is a remotely exploitable vulnerability in a general buffer
management function in versions of OpenSSH prior to 3.7.1. This may
allow a remote attacker to corrupt heap memory which could cause a
denial-of-service condition. It may also be possible for an attacker
to execute arbitrary code."

And allthough I hate to quote the childmolestors at CERT on
anything, it would seem to me that a CERT bulletin, which 
indicates the likely exploitability, of this issue is all
the official leverage an admin would need to convince
management of the need to patch no? 

So with that base covered, why is there still a need for admins
to hunt exploit code on public forums, unwittingly shouting
"look world, I haven't patched any mission critical systems on
my network yet". It's a sad state of affairs when admins are
forced to seek out proof beyond the bulletins of an officially
recognised source of security alerts such as CERT, before given
the green light for downtime. 

So I fail to see why you, or any admin for that matter. Would
need go on "what mitch says" in the first place. My intention
was to make a point about people taking exploits and the 
theory behind exploitation as a given. They see it as a commodity
not recognising the hard work people put into the research
involved.

Secondly I wanted to make people think about the "need" for an
exploit. First of all we have CERT issueing an official bulletin
providing every admin in the world with the leverage they need
to justify downtime. Secondly all the bugdetails and the impact
of the bug have been recognised. What remains is the actual
practical, public, exploitation of the problem. The theory of 
which is readily available for anyone willing to put in the time. 

So, allthough I must say I was pleasantly surprised to see you make
an effort at normal debate, I still believe none of your arguments
apply to this case. Admins shouldn't try to be hackers and I think
you'll agree that most hackers shouldn't try to be admins.

With that solved, I dare to hold to my earlier statement
that there is no need for this exploit to be disclosed. Nor
is there a need for the practical methodology behind the
exploit to be disclosed. There is however, a need for people
who regard the research of others as a commodity that is theirs
for the taking, to rethink their outlook on life.

With regards,
Mitch

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Schmehl, Paul L [mailto:pauls@...allas.edu]
> Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2003, 8:48 AM
> Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com
> Subject: RE: [Full-Disclosure] No Subject (re: openssh exploit code?)
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: mitch_hurrison@...lip.com [mailto:mitch_hurrison@...lip.com] 
> > Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2003 2:23 AM
> > To: Schmehl, Paul L
> > Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com
> > Subject: Re: [Full-Disclosure] No Subject (re: openssh exploit code?)
> > 
> > Again, what is it about your personality that makes you 
> > incapable of taking part in an adult discussion of 
> > responsible disclosure issues? Is it that anyone who has a 
> > different opinion than yours is automatically not worth your 
> > time? That sounds kind of nazi-like to me mr. Schmehl. 
> 
> Oops!  Godwin alert!
> 
> Mitch, I've taken part in quite a few adult discussions.  In this one I
> deliberately choose to mirror your behavior on the list.  I know you
> won't see that or agree with it, but others will.  You come across as an
> arrogant, condescending jerk who thinks they're superior to 99.99% of
> the people on this list.  How do you think people should react to that?
> By cheering you?
> 
> If you're such a great coder that you can figure out exploits when no
> one else can, yet you're unwilling to share even the *theory* behind
> them to this list, then why do you bother posting about it?  Logically,
> the only reason can be to inflate your own image and ego.  It's like the
> little kid who taunts the others at school because he knows something
> that they don't.
> > 
> > It's quite saddening to see this list turn into a pack of 
> > hungry saliving fools at even a hint of an exploit for this 
> > issue. You seem to have more of a hardon for the "juarez" 
> > than any "kiddie" I've ever met. Even when trying to debate 
> > some of the issues surrounding the disclosure of such a 
> > potentially devastating exploit all one gets is "yeah, yeah. 
> > Now make with the warez".
> > 
> I can't speak for others, but I really could care less about the
> exploit.  That's not where my interests lie.  Coding bores me, and I
> only do it when I have to, to solve a problem.  "Slaving away" over
> code, as security snot whined about, is not my idea of time well spent.
> I also don't have any aspirations at mastering quantum physics, but I
> *do* expect the physicists to treat me with the same respect with which
> I treat them.
> 
> If you don't like being treated like a jerk, then don't act like one.
>    
> > As far as it being "easy" to exploit. No it isn't. You have 
> > to abuse a lesser issue, a memory leak to be more precise, to 
> > get a heap layout that will allow you to survive the initial 
> > memset without landing in bad memory. Now without going into 
> > details anyone who manages to survive the initial memset 
> > should be able to debug the crash to the point of 
> > exploitation. This is managable on atleast Linux IA32 systems. 
> > 
> Now this is useful information, which you *could* have shared a long
> time ago, sans attitude.
> 
> > Now I'll try and bring my original point forward one last 
> > time, allthough I fear it will just call for more immature 
> > commentary from the likes of Paul Schmehl.
> > 
> > There is no need for anyone to release this exploit. It will 
> > change nothing about the fact that you need to upgrade your 
> > daemons. It will change nothing about the bugdetails already 
> > published. There is no reasoning for it other than "but I 
> > want to learn how to do it".
> 
> This is where you go off the track.  You clearly don't understand how
> networks and infrastructures work.  As others have already pointed out
> to you, *some* systems can't be taken offline "just" to patch a
> *possible* exploit.  Yeah, I know that there's a group of folks that
> freak out when they hear that.  But in the real world, decisions about
> taking critical systems down are based on a *number* of factors, not
> *just* on whether or not a patch has been released.  So, when people cry
> "It's exploitable" but no clear explanation of why is forthcoming,
> admins tend to discount the claims, chalking them up to more FUD.  After
> all, there are guys (like security snot did) who will claim they "0wn"
> you all day long.  Where's the proof?  Talk is cheap.
> 
> You don't have to release any code to explain the problem.  You can
> write a paper, like Aleph did in "Smashing the Stack....", which
> explains the *theory* behind the problem without providing any usuable
> code for "kiddies".  Or you can provide some details of the theory, as
> you have above, that will point others in the right direction.
> 
> > And sorry but that's just not 
> > good enough to warrant the mayhem that will ensue when an 
> > exploit like this is released. So if you in your academic 
> > pursuits decide to tackle this problem. By all means go right 
> > ahead. But I think anyone who's discovered the real impact of 
> > this bug will realise that disclosing the exploit to the 
> > general public is highly irresponsible. 
> > 
> This, of course, flies in the face of the entire purpose of this list,
> but I'll leave that argument to others.
> > 
> > So instead of trying to poke fun at me Paul, why don't you do 
> > your duty as a knight of Full Disclosure and provide the good 
> > people of this list with a definite analysis on the ossh 32k 
> > nul heap munging? (buzzword quota filled).
> >
> Oh, I'm not poking fun at you at all, Mitch.  I'm mirroring your
> attitude and behavior on the list.  I hope you will see that, but who
> knows.
>  > 
> > There is simply no need for exploits, especially not one that 
> > would affect people and nations around the globe. You have to 
> > look beyond your own little egocentric world of friendly 
> > exploit dev and "but it's fun", and take a look at the bigger 
> > picture. 
> > 
> Again, you miss the point entirely.  The folks that have asked you for
> more information are not looking for "fun".  They are trying to make
> real life decisions about taking down critical systems for **unscheduled
> downtime** to patch them.  You fail to understand that many admins can't
> simply take a system down because Mitch says they should.  They need
> solid arguments to take to their bosses to explain why this particular
> system needs to be downed *today* rather than waiting for a regularly
> scheduled maintenance window.  When a worm comes out, it's a no brainer.
> (But even then sometimes the bosses don't believe you until they've been
> burned at least once.) But admins can't take systems down every time
> someone cries "Patch now!  This is exploitable!"
> 
> I personally would prefer that every system gets patched the day the
> patch is released.  The reality is that it just doesn't happen that way.
> When a professor is in the middle of a major experiment and you tell him
> you have to take his system down *now*, what do you think his reaction
> is going to be?  If he's running a four day simulation, and you asking
> him on day three, you aren't going to get a positive reaction.  There's
> a lot more to taking systems offline to patch them than the word of
> someone on this list.
> 
> Try to think outside your own small box.
> 
> Paul Schmehl (pauls@...allas.edu)
> Adjunct Information Security Officer
> The University of Texas at Dallas
> AVIEN Founding Member
> http://www.utdallas.edu/~pauls/ 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html

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