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From: ALudwig at Calfingroup.com (Andre Ludwig)
Subject: Re: Gates: 'You don't need perfect code' fo
	r good security

I think the issue at hand is how Bill has simply given ideas for band aid
patches and not ways to ultimate secure systems.  Fire walling and virus
protection has its place in any environment.  But poorly designed software
with bugs known and unknown should not be a part of a "secure" system.  So
while some choose to look at the problem at a higher level then others the
issue still remains no matter how many firewalls, av products, IPS's, IDS's
you have in place if your still running shitty software at the end of the
line it is a liability. PLAIN AND SIMPLE

And look at it from Bills view, he cant play on the fact that ultimately it
is the quality of your code that makes a software system safe, not add on
measures.  If he was to openly admit that then it would be the same as Bill
kicking himself in the nuts. Lets face it Bill isn't stupid, he knows what
the real deal is and regardless of what any of us "mailing list experts"
deem is the "truth".  (he is mighty keen on manipulating media as well)

Andre Ludwig, CISSP



-----Original Message-----
From: Geoincidents [mailto:geoincidents@...info.org]
Sent: Friday, October 31, 2003 4:30 PM
To: full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com
Subject: Re: [Full-Disclosure] Re: Gates: 'You don't need perfect code'
for good security


> First, firewalling and patching can not in fact shield networks from
> all of the impact of worms and viruses. Ask any experienced network
> admin. There will always be users who bring into a firewalled network
> a laptop that was, for example, infected at home.

Part of the problem here is network design. For example, if when laptops are
brought in they were only allowed to connect to a wireless network and that
wireless network was on the far side of the firewall (perhaps slightly more
access than from the internet but still majorly firewalled) and treated as
untrusted systems which they in fact are, then it would not be such an
issue.

There is no rule that says you can't have internal firewalls to separate
untrusted from trusted systems. But you have to design your network around
this idea for it to work.

Geo.

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