full-disclosure - Frontpage Extensions Remote Command Execution

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From: mattmurphy at kc.rr.com (mattmurphy@...rr.com)
Subject: Frontpage Extensions Remote Command Execution

"Geo" <geoincidents@...info.org> writes:
>I can't believe MS sat on a root level exploit for almost a YEAR. This is
>trusted computing at it's best?

Well, for one, it's not root level.  It allows ANONYMOUS (Guest) access to
a site using FPSE for anyone who can POST to a vulnerable ISAPI extension. 
FPSE is not enabled by default on any OS other than Windows 2000 Server
series OSes (according to MS), and is usually a security risk anyway. 
Also, the attacker must have the privileges on the underlying file system
to run the ISAPI extension suffering from the flaw -- a privilege that is
usually only granted to Authors and Administrators of the site for
production servers.  The result is that an anonymous user attempting to
attack an IIS site using this flaw would be exploiting an already weakened
config.

You know, I can't believe that people criticize MS for sitting on the
details of root-level holes when they don't even bother to read the
bulletin.  A decent admin would configure FPSE such that this flaw is a
non-issue.  This is because no ordinary user has a reason to be accessing
FPSE's files.  If FPSE is secured, this means that an attacker is getting
their own privileges back.

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