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From: TArseneault at counterpane.com (Tom Arseneault)
Subject: Re: Serious flaws in bluetooth security lea
	d to disclosure of personal data

Actualy you have it wrong (at least as far as BT 1.0 goes, but I have not
found a change in the later rev's by looking at the release notes). Class 3
with 0dbm (1mw) is 10m while class 1 with 20dbm is 100m (Note that the
higher power has the farther range) According to my reading Class 1 is the
most common power level and 10cm was the minimum range before you start
getting reciver saturation.

Thomas J. Arseneault 
Security Engineer
Counterpane Internet Security
tarseneault@...nterpane.com

-----Original Message-----
From: Kurt Seifried [mailto:listuser@...fried.org]
Sent: Friday, November 14, 2003 1:26 PM
To: Schmehl, Paul L; bugtraq@...urityfocus.com;
full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com
Subject: Re: [Full-Disclosure] Re: Serious flaws in bluetooth security
lead to disclosure of personal data


Actually there are three classes of bluetooth:

 Class 3 with with 0 dBm (1 mW), 100M or so range (usually as a seperate
dongle, not many devices have this capability built in as it eats batteries,
however several "base station" products do it).

Class 2 with 4 dBm (2.5 mW), 10M or so range (the "usuall" one)

Class 1 with 20 dBm (100 mW) 10cm range (i.e. physically next to something).

Oh wait. What happens if you get a really good antenna and radiate at a much
higher power, hmmm... you can probably talk to bluetooth devices farther
away... Sort of like 802.11.

Plus you need to consider high volume enclosed spaces like elevators,
turnstiles at subways, building entrances, hotel lobbies, airport lounges,
etc. People are already slapping fake fronts/keypads/card readers onto ATM's
to gather megnetic strip information and PIN numbers (allowing them to clone
your card and raid your account), how hard would it be to build a battery
powered bluetooth equivalent?

Kurt Seifried, kurt@...fried.org
A15B BEE5 B391 B9AD B0EF
AEB0 AD63 0B4E AD56 E574
http://seifried.org/security/



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