full-disclosure - GLSA: rsync.gentoo.org rotation server compromised (200312-01)

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Message-ID: <20031203020117.GN21905@mail.lieber.org>
From: klieber at gentoo.org (Kurt Lieber)
Subject: GLSA: rsync.gentoo.org rotation server compromised (200312-01)

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GENTOO LINUX SECURITY ANNOUNCEMENT 200312-01
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Summary : rsync.gentoo.org rotation server compromised 
             Date : 2003-12-02
          Exploit : remote
              CVE : - None -
         Priority : Normal
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY:
========

On December 2nd at approximately 03:45 UTC, one of the servers that makes up
the rsync.gentoo.org rotation was compromised via a remote exploit.  At this
point, we are still performing forensic analysis.  However, the compromised
system had both an IDS and a file integrity checker installed and we have a
very detailed forensic trail of what happened once the box was breached, so we
are reasonably confident that the portage tree stored on that box was
unaffected.  The attacker appears to have installed a rootkit and
modified/deleted some files to cover their tracks, but left the server
otherwise untouched.  

The box was in a compromised state for approximately one hour before it was
discovered and shut down.  During this time, approximately 20 users
synchronized against the portage mirror stored on this box.  The method used
to gain access to the box remotely is still under investigation.  We will
release more details once we have ascertained the cause of the remote exploit.

This box is not an official Gentoo infrastructure box and is instead donated
by a sponsor.  The box provides other services not related to Gentoo Linux as
well and the sponsor has requested that we not publicly identify the box at
this time.  Because the Gentoo part of this box appears to be unaffected by
this exploit, we are currently honoring the sponsor's request.  That said, if
at any point, we determine that any file in the portage tree was
inappropriately modified, we will release full details about the compromised
server.

SOLUTION
========
Again, based on the forensic analysis done so far, we are reasonably confident
that no files within the Portage tree on the box were affected.  However, the
server has been removed from all rsync.*.gentoo.org rotations and will remain
so until the forensic analysis has been completed and the box has been wiped
and rebuilt.  Thus, users preferring an extra level of security may ensure
that they have a correct and accurate portage tree by running:

emerge sync

Which will perform a sync against another server, thus ensuring that all files
are up to date.
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