Message-ID: <200312100900.cisco-sa-20031210-pub@psirt.cisco.com>
From: psirt at cisco.com (Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team)
Subject: Cisco Security Advisory: Unity Vulnerabilities on IBM-based Servers

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Cisco Security Advisory: Unity Vulnerabilities on IBM-based Servers


Revision Numeral 1.0


For Public Release 2003 December 10 17:00 UTC (GMT)

========================================================================

Contents
========

Summary
Affected Products
Details
Impact
Software Versions and Fixes
Obtaining Fixed Software
Workarounds
Exploitation and Public Announcements
Status of This Notice
Distribution
Revision History
Cisco Security Procedures
========================================================================

Summary
=======

Recent installations of Cisco Unity running on IBM servers contain
default user accounts and default IP addresses which should be removed
or disabled immediately.  Vulnerable systems can be identified by the
part number on the installation disk or by following directions in the
Workarounds section.  Each vulnerability can be verified and removed
manually without requiring an upgrade to new software or
reinstallation.  This vulnerability only applies to IBM-based Cisco
Unity systems installed with specific part numbers on the installation
disks.  No other platforms running Cisco Unity are vulnerable.  

This advisory will be available at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20031210-unity.shtml.


Affected Products
=================

IBM-based Cisco Unity servers purchased either as an MCS server or with
direct IBM branding and installed with the Cisco Unity Server image disk
supplied may be affected.  Cisco Unity servers with the unintended local
user account "bubba", default RAID Manager address, and default DHCP
server address are affected.  Following directions in the Workarounds
section below, existence of each account or address can be verified. 

Part numbers imprinted on the installation disks with a local user
account "bubba", default RAID Manager address, and DHCP server address:
80-7111-01 for the UNITY-SVRX255-1A
80-7112-01 for the UNITY-SVRX255-2A

Part numbers imprinted on the installation disks with default RAID
Manager address and DHCP server address (no local user account "bubba"):
80-6750-01 for the Unity SVRX232-1A
80-6765-01 for the UNITY-SVRX232-2A
80-7108-01 and 80-7108-02 for the UNITY-SVRX205-1A
80-7109-01 and 80-7109-02 for the UNITY-SVRX345-1A
80-7110-01 and 80-7110-02 for the UNITY-SVRX345-2A
80-7002-01 and 80-7003-01 for the UNITY-SVRX255-1A and UNITY-SVRX255-2A
80-7243-01 for the MCS-7815i-2.0-ECS1
80-7242-01 for the MCS-7835i-2.4-ECS1
80-7241-01 for the MCS-7845i-2.4-ECS1
80-7240-01 for the MCS-7845i-2.4-ECS2
80-7237-01 plus 80-7239-01 for the MCS-7855i-1.5-ECS1
80-7236-01 plus 80-7238-01 for the MCS-7855i-1.5-ECS2
80-7237-01 plus 80-7239-01 for the MCS-7865i-1.5-ECS1
80-7236-01 plus 80-7238-01 for the MCS-7865i-1.5-ECS2


Details
=======

Local User Account Issue
- ----------------------
A local user account "bubba" with log on locally rights was created
during manufacturing testing .  

RAID Manager Issue
- ----------------
After installation, if the RAID (Redundant Array of Inexpensive Disks)
Management service is configured to start automatically and not
restricted to local-only, the service tries to establish a TCP session
with a RAID server address which was used during testing at the
manufacturer and leaves the TCP port 34571 open listening for remote
contact.  The TCP connection attempt is directed to an IP address
embedded in the RaidNLst.ser file within the C:\Program Files\RaidMan
directory. This is a configuration file which directs how and to whom
Notification messages are sent for the RAID Management service
(RaidServ.exe).  

DHCP Issue
- --------
After installation, if the Cisco Unity Server  is configured to get an
IP address from a DHCP server and no local server exists, it will
repeatedly send packets attempting to get an IP address from the DHCP
server on the manufacturer's test network.  The manufacturer's DHCP
server IP address will remain in the registry until a local DHCP server
is identified or a static entry is made for a local DHCP server. 


Impact
======

Local User Account Issue
- ----------------------
An unplanned local user account with log on locally rights leaves the
system open to remote login, which may increase the risk of system
compromise and unauthorized administrative access.  

RAID Manager Issue
- ----------------
The RAID Management service attempts to connect to a RAID server on the
manufacturer's test network and leaves the Cisco Unity Server listening
on port 34571 to incoming TCP connections.  The Cisco Unity Server is
attempting to connect to a RAID server with a routable TCP/IP address
that, as of the initial publication of this advisory, does not respond
to pings or connection requests on the Internet, but good security
practices suggest limiting connection attempts to known servers.  No
known exploits related to port 34571 are known as of the initial
publication of this advisory, but good security practices suggest
closing all unutilized ports.  

DHCP Issue
- --------
If no local DHCP server exists or no static entry is made for a local
DHCP server, the Cisco Unity Server will repeatedly send packets
requesting an address from the DHCP server on the manufacturer's test
network.   Once the DHCP server address has been resolved locally, the
Cisco Unity Server registry key will be updated with the DHCP server IP
address and host name, and no further impact is expected. 


Software Versions and Fixes
===========================

The vulnerabilities are specific to the IBM-based Unity servers and all
vulnerabilities listed in this advisory can be removed with specific
actions to eliminate the account or addresses, so no software is required.  


Obtaining Fixed Software
========================

As the fix for this vulnerability is a default configuration change, and
a workaround is available, a software upgrade is not required to address
this vulnerability.

If you need assistance with the implementation of the workarounds, or
have questions on the workarounds, please contact the Cisco Technical
Assistance Center (TAC).

Cisco TAC contacts are as follows:

    * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
    * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world
    * e-mail: tac@...co.com

See http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml for
additional TAC contact information, including special localized
telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in
various languages.

Please do not contact either "psirt@...co.com" or
"security-alert@...co.com" for software upgrades.


Workarounds
===========

Local User Account Issue
- ----------------------
Remove the "bubba" local user account.  Open Computer Management, click
Start, point to Settings, and then click Control Panel.  Double-click
Administrative Tools, and then double-click Computer Management.  Click
the Local Users and Group folder. Double-click the Users folder.
Right-click on the "bubba" user and select Delete.  The vulnerability is
not present if the user "bubba" does not exist.

Raid Manager Issue
- ----------------
Remove all entries in the Raid Manager program for unwanted notification
servers in the RaidNLst.ser file.  Go to the Start menu and select
Programs.  Launch the ServeRAID Manager.  Go to the Actions menu, select
Configure ServeRAID Agent, select Notifications.  In the new window
right click the row for each undesired RAID Management server and select
Delete System.  Close the application.  There is no need to reboot. 
Upon exiting the program, a new RaidNLst.ser file is created with no
references to any IP addresses.  Do not simply delete the file without
modifying the configuration via the program, as a new RaidNLst.ser file
is created which contains the reference to the manufacturer's address
again.  The vulnerability is not present if unwanted notification
servers are not present in the RaidNLst.ser file.

Set the RAID Management service to local to turn off listening on port
34571.  Go to the Start menu, point to Settings, move the cursor to
Control Panel and select Services.  Select ServeRAID Management Service
and change the properties to Disabled.  Then go to the Start menu and
select Programs.  Launch the ServeRAID Manager and go to the File menu
tab.  Select User Preferences and click on the Remote Access Settings
tab.  Under Startup Mode check the "Local Only" checkbox.  Click OK and
then at the resulting dialog box click OK again.  Close the
application.  There is no need to reboot.  The vulnerability is not
present if the RAID Management service is set to local. 

DHCP Issue
- --------
After initial installation, to ensure the Cisco Unity Server does not
send multiple DHCP requests and properly resolves its IP Address, either
assign a static IP address or local address for the DHCP server.  Cisco
Unity server documentation discourages using DHCP for the server,
recommending Cisco Unity Servers always use static IP addresses. 
Multiple DHCP requests will not be sent to the manufacturer's server if
the Cisco Unity server is functioning with an IP address. 


Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================

The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory.


Status of This Notice: FINAL
============================

This is a final notice. Although Cisco cannot guarantee the accuracy of
all statements in this notice, all of the facts have been checked to the
best of our ability. Cisco does not anticipate issuing updated versions
of this advisory unless there is some material change in the facts.
Should there be a significant change in the facts, Cisco will update
this advisory.


Distribution
============

This notice will be posted on Cisco's worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20031210-unity.shtml.  In
addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is
clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following
e-mail and Usenet news recipients:

    * cust-security-announce@...co.com
    * first-teams@...st.org (includes CERT/CC)
    * bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
    * full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com
    * vulnwatch@...nwatch.org
    * cisco@...t.colorado.edu
    * cisco-nsp@...k.nether.net
    * comp.dcom.sys.cisco
    * ntbugtraq@...tserv.ntbugtraq.com
    * Various internal Cisco mailing lists

Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's 
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing 
lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged 
to check the above URL for any updates.


Revision History
================

Revision 1.0 	10-December-2003 	Initial Public Release.


Cisco Security Procedures
=========================

Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering
to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's
worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/sec_incident_response.shtml. This
includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security
notices. All Cisco Security Advisories are available at
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
========================================================================

This notice is Copyright 2003 by Cisco Systems, Inc. This notice may be
redistributed freely after the release date given at the top of the
text, provided that redistributed copies are complete and unmodified,
and include all date and version information.

========================================================================

All contents are Copyright © 1992--2003 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights
reserved. 
Important Notices <http://www.cisco.com/public/copyright.html>  
PrivacyStatement <http://www.cisco.com/public/privacy.html>



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