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Message-ID: <KFEMINDBKGBEMHACCJHCAEFDDMAA.brett@softwarecreations.co.nz>
From: brett at softwarecreations.co.nz (Brett Moore)
Subject: RE: [kinda-but-not-really-Full-Disclosure-so-we-feel-warm-and-fuzzy] Re: <to various comments>EEYE: Microsoft ASN.1 ...

Its great...

With the MS patching been relegated to monthly, it means we only have
to put up with this crap once a month... but man it drags on.. and on...
and on....

Everyone has an opinion, agreed. But its not like those same opinions
are not shared by others.. Some would like full disclosure, because its
interesting and inciteful... And knowing how to exploit one bug can lead
to the discovery of similar bugs... But then we may as well start discussing
the fact that if researchers didn't find and disclose bugs, then would the
'bad guys' really find them... Maybe, maybe not.. But I'd bet top $ that
there are 'bad guys' out there finding these things for a reason and not
disclosing. Because said 'bad guys' are not part of what we call the
'security community'...

Because it must be realised that as soon as a patch and or advisory is
released
there are global teams of people working to discover and exploit said bug.
I'd take a stab and say US, Chinese, Russian, Middle eastern and possibly
even outerspace 'spy' agencies as well as organised crime and mafia  right
down
to 'hacking' groups, uni students and other security enthusiasts.

It's pretty obvious with the latest releases from ngssoftware that they
are not providing any details... And eEye it seems is no longer providing
step by step intructions... Thats their choice. In fact we should be
lucky that they provide any details, or would you prefer that they kept
quiet and MS just released patches for 'undisclosed' problems...

Or is there a real need for a 'real-full-disclosure' list where membership
is restricted and details are shared (if it doesn't already exist)...
If that happened then ppl that don't like it should not subscribe, and then
they can feel better... Ignorance is bliss (thats a phrase not something
directed at anyone, in fact I sometimes prefer bliss).

> Administrators don't need this crap to fix their boxes, they simply need
Some do, some don't.. But all developers of internet facing applications,
sure as hell better care about this stuff.

> running.  The average worm writer is not competent enough to reverse
> engineer a ms patch to find the changed code and produce a working
Perhaps,.. Code red was intense in the 'features' that it used and even the
method of exploiting the bug..
And wasn't it the peeps from x-focus that published details of the RPC Dcom
bug, after LSD refused to release details....

To quote a kiwi drinking at a bar 'we should just say that there are no
more bugs, and that all computers are secure'....

And the rapping and other humor in advisories.. So what.. Who decided that
this industry couldn't be fun... Just because ppl are highly intelligent
and tuned into security research, doesn't mean they are not allowed to have
a laugh...

>The strategy is simple, patch, patch, patch.
Yup. Because with or without 'step by step' deatils, the timeframe is down
to less than 60 days, if not 30.

-----Original Message-----
From: full-disclosure-admin@...ts.netsys.com
[mailto:full-disclosure-admin@...ts.netsys.com]On Behalf Of Paul Tinsley
Sent: Thursday, February 12, 2004 7:57 PM
To: Drew Copley
Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com
Subject: Re: [Full-Disclosure] Re: Re: <to various comments>EEYE:
Microsoft ASN.1 ...


Drew Copley wrote:

>Without replying to each troll, individually, I thought maybe some
>people would like to see some answers to some notes.
>
>
Most of these are from me, so I will personally respond to those that
apply.  And believe it or not, this is not a troll, I really wanted to
see people's viewpoints on this subject.  Thats the neat part about us
not all working at the same company or striving for the same goals, we
have different viewpoints.  Asking for enumeration of those CAN be for
purposes other than trolling, if I wanted to troll I would just reload
the slashdot main page till a new story came out and mention something
about hot grits and first post.

>These are my own comments, I speak for myself.
>
>Question: "Why release all of the details"
>
>
This statement is not an accurate paraphrase, I didn't say why release
them all.  I said why release them all on day 0 of the patch release.

>Answer: Polls show this is what administrators what. This is one reason
>we do this. Another reason we do this is simple, we use the details
>ourselves. We use the details to create signatures for our vulnerability
>assessment tool and firewall. Security administrators then download
>these signatures and use them to check for patches or to protect systems
>which can not yet be patched.
>
>
Administrators don't need this crap to fix their boxes, they simply need
the exploit vectors, the possible mitigation steps, and the potential
severity of the vulnerability.  No sysadmin should have time, nor care
about the call made to localalloc, the decoder functions it effects,
etc...  The pieces that are needed to make a threat assessment and
develop a mitigation strategy, IMHO, are all in your bulletin, and
contained in these sections: Systems Affected, Services Affected,
Software Affected, Description, Severity.  From that it's pretty obvious
how bad this one can be, knowing that we can't make people stop using
Outlook in a corporate environment, or stop using Internet Explorer to
go to several popular sites, or any of the other numerous 3rd party apps
that are affected by this.  The strategy is simple, patch, patch, patch.

That is something that takes time in a large enterprise where you have
to worry about the effects it will have on day to day business.  You
can't just flip a switch and deploy vendor patches the day they come
out, I think we all know that Microsoft patches do have bugs from time
to time and knowing how these will affect your "officially supported"
corporate applications is important.  Reducing the safe margin of time
that one has to do that IS a problem in my eyes.

>It does not matter if it is eEye you are talking about in this scenario,
>or one of our competitors. This is the "behind the scenes" picture of
>what happens when a patch is released.
>
Show me one competitor that releases such detail at day 0 of patch release.

>
>When we - or our competitors - do not have full details on a
>vulnerability, we have to reverse engineer the patch to do so. And, we
>all do this.
>
>
I am sorry that you have to do what you get paid to do.  Would it be an
unreasonable thing to consider a gentlemans agreement between assessment
vendors to share network behavioral fingerprints for vulns such as
these?  The finder still gets credit, the vendor still gets to help his
clients, and next time he isn't the one to find it he still gets to help
his clients.  Seems like a decent deal to me...

>So, people complaining about us releasing all of the details... They
>simply are ignorant of what must be done in this process. They like to
>scream and shout about how a worm will be coming and such, nevermind
>that they don't even understand our advisories in the first place.
>
>
>
Don't hold yourself in such high reguard to believe that people the
likes of me cannot comprehend your bulletins, you would be wrong.

>And if this does not make it all incredibly clear, let's spell it out
>for them: we can reverse engineer the patches and have to... If virus
>writers want to, they can, too, as well.
>
>
Tell me that you have seen complex worms recently?  Most if not all of
them are cobbled together from exploit code the author found on some
leet mad phat message board and added in some visual basic or visual c
to tie the whole thing together to get their spam gateway up and
running.  The average worm writer is not competent enough to reverse
engineer a ms patch to find the changed code and produce a working
exploit from it.

[ .. snip .. ]

>Question/Comment: "What is this thing with rapping?"
>
>Answer: We have had these kinds of things in our advisories since we
>started releasing them way back when.
>
>Derek, at times, feels the need to bust a rhyme.
>
>You are not going to stop him.
>
>
Don't plan to, but perception is reality, if you look like a script
kiddy, it's going to be really really hard for a large company to write
you a fat check.  I don't know if you noticed but the day of cutsie
titles are playful antics are a thing of the past, most people have
gotten back to real business by now.

>And, I have tried. Knives, ropes, pits, strangulation. He is quite wily.
>
[ .. snip .. ]

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