full-disclosure - secure downloading of patches (Re: Knocking Microsoft)

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From: blancher at cartel-securite.fr (Cedric Blancher)
Subject: secure downloading of patches (Re: Knocking
	Microsoft)

Le dim 29/02/2004 ? 17:57, Martin Ma?ok a ?crit :
> You are true that PGP is a stronger protection from this point of view
> but keep in mind that neither SSL nor PGP can protect us in the case
> of the compromised end point -- the server or developper's workstation
> in the case of SSL/TLS and the developper's workstation in the case of
> PGP.

Developper's private key compromission is quite unlikely to happen,
although it is clearly possible, especially if we think to Valve case
(code source steal through developper station compromise).

> From the other point of view, only SSL/TLS can protect you against the
> attacks on the transfer itself. For example, the attacker can poison
> your DNS cache and trick you into connecting to the site that does not
> provide the patch (so you stay vulnerable).

True, this is definitly a good point I didn't think of.

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