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Message-ID: <40473443.14646.3174CEC@localhost> From: nick at virus-l.demon.co.uk (Nick FitzGerald) Subject: Backdoor not recognized by Kaspersky "Aditya, ALD [Aditya Lalit Deshmukh]" wrote: <<snip>> > how about the smtp server simply rejecting mail from spoofed hosts ? as > all the viruses generate spoofed hosts and it is very easy for any smtp > server to do a dns lookup on the sending server, if the hostname / ip > address do not match reject the message. Because, no matter how much you may not like it, some of us have to use spoofing. It is a designed in feature -- sure a "weakness" by today's standards, but not as much of a weakness as the fact that the whole Internet as we know it is based on protocols and mechanisms that _assume_ physical security and guaranteed locatability of connected machines and those with administrative authority over them. In fact, those factors were so deeply ingrained in the original design that I doubt anyone involved in spec'ing, designing and implementing what became ARPAnet even thought to ask about such issues. In short, _if_ something was on that network it was _supposed to be there_. Who in their right mind would adopt such a system for "the Information Super-highway" and encourage business to "get on the net" when it was deployed as an open sewer rather than a self-trusting closed network?? Gluing another layer of "machine authentication" into the SMTP protocol won't fix any of the fundamental underlying problems that allow spam and mass-mailed viruses to aggrieve us so... Regards, Nick FitzGerald
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