full-disclosure - erase with magnet

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Message-ID: <407184FB.6020909@compt.com>
From: twkonefal at compt.com (Tomasz Konefal)
Subject: erase with magnet

Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu wrote:
> 1) Gutmann's 35 passes were devised to stress the recording methodologies
> of the day.  Many of them are for encoding schemes not used anymore.
> 
> 2) Canadian RCMP TSSIT OPS-II says: "Must first be checked for correct functioning
> and then have all storage areas overwritten once with the binary digit ONE,
> once with the binary digit ZERO and once with a single numeric, alphabetic or
> special character, " (http://jya.com/rcmp2.htm)
> 
> American DoD 5220-22.M says: "Overwriting all addressable locations with a
> character, its complement, then a random character and verify."  This is
> permitted for classifications up to SECRET.  It is not acceptable for
> TOP SECRET and higher.
> 
> I have to conclude that *our* spooks are of the opinion that even 3 passes
> are sufficient to wipe out data thoroughly enough so that it's not worth it
> for the *other* spooks to try recovering 'Secret'...

here is a more recent paper from the RCMP along similar lines:

http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/tsb/pubs/it_sec/g2-003_e.pdf

cheers,
   twkonefal


-- 
Tomasz Konefal
Systems Administrator
Command Post and Transfer Corp.
416-585-9995 x.349