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Subject: SECURITY.NNOV: Sambar security quest

 This  advisory is old (originally discovered in January, 2003 published
 by  iDefense[1] and fixed by Vendor[2] in September, 2003) but probably
 is generally unknown, at least there is no CVE entries. It can interest
 you,  if you tired of endless crossite scriptings, buffer overflows and
 SQL injections and would like to play with "logic bombs".


 Probably you heard about different "security games". Usually it's a set
 of  tasks you have to complete to win. I would like to offer you a same
 security  quest with only difference - it's from real life. Aim of this
 quest  is  to  get  full  control  under host with Sambar Server 5.x (I
 played with 5.2 but 5.3 should be fine. You can download it from [3]).

 Sambar is HTTP Web and proxy server. If you think Sambar is yet another
 lame  one  day living "web server" with directory traversals and buffer
 overflows you're wrong. This application is developed by Tod Sambar for
 long  time,  multiple  problems were fixed and now it's widely used and
 secure  enough  to  get  some  pleasure playing with it. Length of HTTP
 request  and  all  HTTP  headers are limited in size. Content-Length is
 checked  and  limited.  URL  must  contain  only  configurable  set  of
 characters  -  otherwise  request  is  ignored.  Directory traversal is
 checked  before  any web file is accessed. Type of the file is checked,
 and  there is no special DOS device access problem. All operations have
 timeouts. HTTP proxy and multiple scripts in cgi-bin are only available
 from  cgi-bin  is stored aside of documents root. Passwords
 are stored encrypted.


 Get  remote  control on Sambar server 5.x in default configuration with
 random administrator's password under following conditions:

 1.  We  should  not  debug  or desassembly code (violation of copyright
 2.  We  should  not  code  any  exploits  ("no  more  public  exploits"
 3.  We  should  not use  any  information  on security vulnerabilities,
 because    it's    illegal  in  France. I known, it sounds strange, but
 any  of  features described below are usually classified  with "LOW" or
 "NO" security risk.

 Steps are:

 1. Get access to proxy server.
 2. Hide real IP from Web server using 1
 3. Obtain passwords list from Web server using 2
 4. Obtain administrator password using 3
 5. Upload executable file as web document using 4
 6. Execute file uploaded at step 5

 Now,  if  you  want  to  try this quest by yourself you should download
 Sambar  and stop reading this article. Of cause, there can be more than
 one valid solutions.


 Step 1.

   You can access proxy server.

   Explanation: In default configuration proxy server is only accessible
   from  address,  but web server is available from Internet.
   Both  proxy  and web requests are processed by the same engine on the
   same  port (TCP/80). We can use http keep-alive connections to bypass
   Proxy server limitation:

   TCP connection established
   -> GET / HTTP/1.1
      Connection: keep-alive
                                            this  is  valid  web  server
                                            request. It's granted.

   <- Sambar default web page

                                            because    connection   is
                                            keep-alive  it's  not broken
                                            after page is sent.

   -> GET HTTP/1.1

                                            this    is   valid   proxy
                                            requests.  This  time source
                                            IP is not validated, because
                                            connection  was  established
   <- Web page from external site
                                            Sambar proxies our request
 Step 2.

   We can access Web server on address via proxy server.

   Explanation:  We  can  use  proxy  to  access  Web server on loopback
   interface.  Because  in this case proxy server requests web page, web
   server thinks peer address is

 Step 3.

   User  accessing  Web  server  from can download any (small)

   Explanation:  there  is formmail script called This script
   can  send  e-mail  to  given  address  with  given  subject, body and
   attached  file.  Script  is  only available from localhost because of
   this check:

        $host_test = $ENV{'REMOTE_ADDR'};
        if (!($host_test eq ''))
                print "Only localhost is allowed to use this script!\n";

   We know, how to bypass it. It also checks all fields:

        if (($server =~ /[;><&\*'\|]/ ) ||
            ($from =~ /[;><&\*'\|]/ ) ||
            ($subject =~ /[;><&\*'\|]/ ) ||
            ($attach =~ /[;><&\*'\|]/ ) ||
            ($to =~ /[;><&\*'\|]/ ))
                print "<HTML><TITLE>Invalid fields</TITLE><BODY>\n";
                print "One or more the following fields have invalid characters:<BR>\n";
                print "<I>server</I> <I>from</I> <I>to</I> <I>subject</I> <I>attach</I>\n";
                print "</BODY></HTML>\n";

        if ($attach =~ /([^\.]+)\//)
                print "<HTML><TITLE>Invalid attachment path</TITLE><BODY>\n";
                print "An invalid attachment path was specified.<BR>\n";
                print "</BODY></HTML>\n";
   Later  all arguments are used to construct command line executed with
   system() call.

   Attachment  must  be  located  within  doc (Web documents) directory.
   Directory  traversal  and  pipes can not be used... In fact they can.
   First,  we  can use absolute path because neither ':' nor '/' nor '\'
   are  filtered.  Installation path can be discovered using information
   leakage  bug  rediscovered  by  Gregory  Le  Bras...  Well,  it's not
   interesting, we can find another way.

   You  should  remember  bright  RFP's  Phrack  article,  there must be
   something   he   missed.  He  did.  First,  he  missed  "poisoned  \n
   character".  Imagine  echo  hello\necho  world...  It's not our case.
   Because  it  works  for  *nix,  and  we  are  under  Windows.  That's
   _mmmmmain_  thing  missed  by  nearly everyone who wrights about perl
   security.   Under  Windows  shell  characters  and  shell  itself  is
   different.  In  this  case  '%' character is not filtered, we can use
   %QUERY_STRING%  as a file name and send any name we want via URL like in a POST request.

 Step 4.

   Admin's password can be recovered from config\passwd file.

   Explanation:  Access  to  administration  interface  is  limited  to  (we  know  how  to  bypass  this  limitation)  and default
   admin's  password is empty. Of cause, documentation recommends to set
   strong   password   for  admin  account.  Passwords  are  stored  in
   config\passwd file encrypted:

          admin:root:2111DF241FF52D16:/docs/:2:0:System Administrator

   sacrypt.exe  is  used  to  get  crypted  password.  Block cypher with
   statically compiled key is used for encryption. It means password can
   be  restored.  By  viewing  sacrypt.exe  in  text  viewer  we can see
   cm_twowayencrypt  function imported from sambarcm.dll. After password
   is encrypted, it's converted to hex with cm_bin2hex. Of cause, we can
   debug  Sambar,  to  find out that encryption is Blowfish and discover
   key  used,  but  it's  not what we're going to do. Function for block
   encryption  and  decryption  are  usually  use same arguments. We can
   change  2  bytes  in  sacrypt.exe  (namely change cm_twowayencrypt to
   cm_twowaydecrypt  in  import  table)  to  make  sacrypt.exe  decoding
   passwords  instead  of  encoding.  FAR  has  good  editor, it doesn't
   corrupt binary files. Now
    1. Convert encoded password from hex to bin
    2. decrypt it with modified sacrypt.exe
    3. Convert decoded password from hex to bin
   You can use notepad.exe and calc.exe
 Step 5.

   Administrator can upload files to Web document directory

   In  default  configuration  Administrator  is allowed to use HTTP PUT
   method  to  upload  files  to  Web  documents  (\doc)  directory from  address. Basic HTTP authentication can be used. (Hint: you
   can  use  your  favorite  mail agent to construct base64-encoded HTTP
   Authorization: field).
 Step 6.

   You can run executable file located in document root directory.

   Explanation:  Sambar  supports  template  files  with .stm extension.
   <RCC>  tag  of  Sambar  allows  to include result of external program
   execution into web page. By default, program is executed from cgi-bin
   directory,  but we can specify something like <RCC../docs/myprog.exe>
   to  execute  file  located  in Web documents directory. Myprog.exe is
   executed upon request to stm file.

That's all.


 One more funny bug.

 If  you  have  physical access to Sambar host you can compromise server
 without loging in. Sounds exciting.

 Explanation:  Sambar  always  check a type of file to eliminate special
 device  access.  But for perl scripts it uses external perl interpreter
 (IndigoPerl      5.6)     which     doesn't.     If     you     request
 http://sambar/cgi-bin/  IndigoPerl  reads Perl script from COM1:
 port.  If  you  have  physical  access to host and you can connect your
 device  to  COM1 you can execute PERL script with permissions of SAMBAR
 server  (usually  LocalSystem).  This  is  a  case  "Special DOS device
 access" bug leads to privilege escalation rather than to DoS.


[1] Sambar Server Multiple Vulnerabilities
[2] Sambar Server Security Alert
[3] Sambar Server 5.3 download
[4] Multiple bugs in Sambar
[5] Sambar Server all versions password decoding

        { , . }     |\
+--oQQo->{ ^ }<-----+ \
|  ZARAZA  U  3APA3A   } You know my name - look up my number (The Beatles)
+-------------o66o--+ /

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