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Message-ID: <1088698510.557.24.camel@localhost> From: frank at knobbe.us (Frank Knobbe) Subject: Presidential Candidates' Websites Vulnerable On Thu, 2004-07-01 at 10:48, Jordan Klein wrote: > Oh yes, and there should be a checksum of the unique number assigned to each > vote to ensure that someone couldn't just reverse engineer the barcode and > make up a bunch of bogus votes. I'm not sure exactly how that part would > work, but I'm sure there's a way. There needs to be mechanism to block "a bunch of made-up votes". Someone could also make up fake punch-cards. Same issue, same solution. More important is the issue of *disappearing* votes. Voter gets a receipt, yes, but how can you guarantee that her vote (bar code or otherwise) has actually been counted? Regards, Frank -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 187 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part Url : http://lists.grok.org.uk/pipermail/full-disclosure/attachments/20040701/fe5249b3/attachment.bin
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