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From: Valdis.Kletnieks at vt.edu (Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu) Subject: No shell => secure? On Thu, 08 Jul 2004 12:04:53 +0200, Matthias Benkmann <msbREMOVE-THIS@...terdrache.de> said: > I can't say I've looked at much exploit-code so far but the POC exploits > to gain root I've seen for Linux all executed /bin/sh. I'd like to know if > this is true for in-the-wild exploits to root a box, too. If so, would it > be a useful security measure to rename /bin/sh and other shells (after > making sure that everything that needs them has been updated to the new > name, of course)? The problem is making sure that *everything* has been updated, and stays updated. > If renaming the shell is not enough, how about renaming all of the > standard Unix top-level directories (such as /bin, /etc,...)? Would that > defeat standard exploits to root a box? It would also defeat standard ways to install patches and so on. Don't forget to grep all your shared libraries (hint - how many places doe glibc look in /etc for stuff?) Unless it's an embedded system that only needs like 6 binaries to do its job, you will go nuts trying to maintain it. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 226 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://lists.grok.org.uk/pipermail/full-disclosure/attachments/20040709/95c4e728/attachment.bin
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