full-disclosure - Is Mozilla's "patch" enough?

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Message-ID: <87r7rh59r8.fsf@deneb.enyo.de>
From: fw at deneb.enyo.de (Florian Weimer)
Subject: Is Mozilla's "patch" enough?

* Aviv Raff:

> On Mon, 12 Jul 2004 20:34:44 +0200, Florian Weimer <fw@...eb.enyo.de> wrote:
>> * Aviv Raff:
>> 
>> > Security patches shouldn't be overridden unless intended too (i.e
>> > uninstalled).
>> 
>> This is not standard industry practice.  Especially if a patch might
>> break previously working configuration, I completely agree that it's
>> correct.
>
> That's why there should be a way to uninstall the patch, as I wrote.

This requires that you have individual patches for each vulnerability,
something that is often practically impossible (because of
combinatoric explosion) and is a support nightmare if it is possible.

Those vendors supplying source code are far better off in this area.
You simply pick the parts you like and recompile your own version.