full-disclosure - Is Mozilla's "patch" enough?

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Message-ID: <40F3A83C.4070209@yahoo.com.tw>
From: whiteclover79-security at yahoo.com.tw (Daniel Wang)
Subject: Is Mozilla's "patch" enough?

Aviv Raff wrote:
> How can it not be a security flaw of mozilla if a setting in the
> user.js overrides the global security setting defined by a patch, and
> any manual setting defined by the user through the about:config?
> 
> I understand that if an attacker has the ability to change the user.js
> file he can do worse things, but why should there be a way to override
> security patches without uninstalling them?
> 
> I think user.js (or the lockPref settings in mozila.cfg) makes Mozilla
> more spyware/worms oriented.

Please explain your point.

AFAIK, the preferences component of Mozilla has no code that can write 
to user.js.

As for mozilla.cfg, 1) it is obscured by simple byte-shift, 2) its first 
line is bypassed (and should be made an invalid JS code), and 3) must be 
referenced in all.js (or another default pref file) to work.

I don't understand how someone can change user.js/mozilla.cfg without 
already having access to the client computer.