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Message-ID: <20040720203700.46006.qmail@web51707.mail.yahoo.com>
From: lathama at lathama.com (Andrew Latham)
Subject: Re: Motivations... (was IE now on-topic
Thank you.
I was fishing for info and found a gold mine. So to put it very vaugly we could
say that greed, anger, or boredom.
So as a moralist/agnostic geek - translated - I truely do understand most all
of the sides and agree with everyone to a degree
What are the important things to think about to secure any client.
1. Leaving employees.
2. Current employees.
3. Targeted systems (how interesting do I look to a black hat.)
4. Financial gain - how to apply this vaugly to most clients?
-- Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu wrote:
> On Tue, 20 Jul 2004 12:36:06 PDT, Andrew Latham said:
>
> > 1. Boredom - more brains than hobbies
> > 2. Needs
> > - burstable bandwidth - downloads
> > - knowledge
> > - bragin rights
> > 3. Challenges
> > 4. Other
>
> You're equating "black hat" with one subset thereof, more or less. It's a
> lot
> more complicated in the real world...
>
> I'd posit that the goals and motivations of the black hat can be classified
> in
> three wide ranges, with totally different threat models:
>
> 1) "type of target" - you don't care who's box it is - you want "any suitable
> zombie", "any suitable Windows/IIS server", "any suitable Solaris box".
>
> 2) "identity of target" - The target has been selected because it's a server
> for company X, or you want to deface the webpage for organization Y, or it's
> payback time for black-hat Z.
>
> 3) "monetary/related gain" - you really don't care who the target is, it's
> all
> about the paycheck - whether it's 500K zombies created by a virus-for-pay, or
> a
> hacking run against a server that has credit card numbers on it...
>
> Notice that there can be overlap - a black hat engaging in (2) or (3) may
> very
> well want to pick up a collection of type (1) stepping-stone machines to
> launch
> the attack from.
>
> Also, a target can be in different categories at the same time - it can be
> probed by a script kiddie looking for zombies, while at the same time it's
> being targeted by a disgruntled ex-employee and a professional criminal.
>
> Understanding the differences is important - a defense sufficient to stop the
> random probing (1) won't slow down either of the other two. However, the
> professional criminal is more likely to nail you with a 0-day - but will move
> along if they decide the risk/payoff ratio is bad (they see you have enough
> network monitors to nail their ass in court, they're outta there ;). The
> disgruntled ex-staffer may not have a 0-day - but they may well decide it's a
> personal issue and *keep* attacking when a professional would move on...
>
>
> ATTACHMENT part 2 application/pgp-signature
=====
*----------------------------------------------------------*
Andrew Latham AKA: LATHAMA (lay-th-ham-eh) - LATHAMA.COM
LATHAMA@...HAMA.COM - LATHAMA@...OO.COM
If yahoo.com is down we have bigger problems than my email!
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