Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.58.0408061440331.2220@screamer.tcp-ip.info>
From: dhudes at tcp-ip.info (Dana Hudes)
Subject: Clear text password exposure in Datakey's
 tokens and smartcards

as I understand it a "PIN Card" is a card with an EEPROM on it that
contains a PIN.  Possibly encrypted but its the same effect as any other 
file. The host decides if the PIN matches. 

A smart card has onboard microprocessor with software that includes 
encryption support (in my day it was DES). The reader presents the PIN to 
the card and the *card* not only can authenticate but also provide 
authorization information (or any other supplementary response,
such as not just a PGP  key pair (i.e. the secret and public keys) but the 
user's keyring as well. Even more interesting and useful is the use of 
this card to run algorithms to provide one-time pad ciphers. 
While you could do that host-based from a regular EEPROM card it requires 
that the host know the pad selection algorithm . 




 On Fri, 6 Aug 2004 Bart.Lansing@...ls.com 
wrote:

> 
> Guys...
> 
> RSA has been doing PIN cards for ages...I don't get the hangup on 
> SmartCards vs "plain old" something you have/something you know two factor
> 
> http://www.rsasecurity.com/node.asp?id=1311
> 
> Cost of entry/ownership is nothing remotely close to the $1000 you mention 
> Lyal...in fact, it's under 1/10 of that on a per seat basis...
> 
> Why get hung up on it being a smartcard, when you can do two factor with a 
> much lower entry cost and do it, frankly, easier?
> 
> Bart Lansing
> Manager, Desktop Services
> Kohl's IT
> 
> 
> full-disclosure-admin@...ts.netsys.com wrote on 08/05/2004 08:45:33 PM:
> 
> > This exposure, of PIN compromise, is genric in all smartcard products 
> today,
> > unless a dedicated PINpad or biometric-sensor  equipped readers are used 
> -
> > putting cost of ownership towards $1000 in some cases.
> > PC/SC doesn't help - as a data interfcae API spec, it excludes human
> > interface aspects.  STIP (Small Terminal Interoperability Platform at
> > www.stip.org) moves in this direction, but has evolved into many 
> variants to
> > interoperate with proprietary vendors and proprietary industry 
> standards.
> > 
> > The challenges in putting biometric sensors or PINpads onto cards 
> include
> > the need to conform to ISO 7816 for form factor, physical resilience 
> etc,
> > and that the cards are unpowered.  Or, someone redesigns the entire
> > form-factor, user interface model, portability and business model -
> > something that has previously failed to go anywhere.
> > 
> > Something like a mobile phone or PDA is a good compromise tool to this
> > overall exposure, imho.
> > 
> > Lyal
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Kevin Sheldrake [mailto:kev@...ctriccat.co.uk] 
> > Sent: Thursday, 5 August 2004 8:39 PM
> > To: Toomas Soome; lionel.ferette@...net.be
> > Cc: vuln@...view.com; full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com;
> > bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
> > Subject: Re: [Full-Disclosure] Clear text password exposure in Datakey's
> > tokens and smartcards
> > 
> > 
> > Surely if the user is entering a passphrase then the same problem exists 
> - 
> > that of effectively eavesdropping that communication from the keyboard?
> > 
> > Ignoring the initial expense for a moment, wouldn't it have made a lot 
> of 
> > sense to include the keypad actually on the cards?  Obviously, card 
> > readers would need to be contructed such that the keypad part of the 
> card 
> > would be exposed during use.  The keypad security could then rely on the 
>  
> > tamper resistant properties of the rest of the card.
> > 
> >  From a costs perspective, I would guess that the actual per-card cost 
> > increase would be minimal if hundreds of millions of these cards were 
> > produced.
> > 
> > Kev
> > 
> > 
> > > Lionel Ferette wrote:
> > >
> > >> Note that this is true for almost all card readers on the market, not 
>  
> > >> only for Datakey's. Having worked for companies using crypto smart 
> > >> cards, I have conducted a few risk analysis about that. The 
> conclusion 
> > >> has always been that if the PIN must be entered from a PC, and the 
> > >> attacker has means to install software on the system (through 
> directed 
> > >> viruses, social engineering, etc), the game's over.
> > >>  The only solution against that problem is to have the PIN entered 
> > >> using a keypad on the reader. Only then does the cost of an attack 
> > >> raise significantly. But that is opening another can of worms, 
> because 
> > >> there is (was?) no standard for card readers with attached pin pad 
> (at 
> > >> the time, PC/SCv2 wasn't finalised - is it?).
> > >>
> > >
> > > at least some cards are supporting des passphrases to implement 
> secured 
> > > communication channels but I suppose this feature is not that widely 
> in 
> > > use....  how many card owners are prepared to remember both PIN codes 
> > > and passphrases...
> > >
> > > toomas
> > >
> > >
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > -- 
> > Kevin Sheldrake MEng MIEE CEng CISSP
> > Electric Cat (Bournemouth) Ltd
> > 
> > 
> > _______________________________________________
> > Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> > Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
> 
> 
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